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INTRODUCTION

The Establishment Clause1 - and particularly the issue of gov
ernment funding of religious education2 - is one of the murkiest areas

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.").
2. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 12.2.6.2, at 1007 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court's decisions on government aid to
religious elementary and secondary schools are often "difficult to reconcile").
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of Supreme Court j urisprudence.3 The Supreme Court has acknowl
edged as much,4 and the sharp divide in the Court's most recent forays
into Establishment Clause territory illustrates the point that the cur
rent j urisprudential standards allow for a broad range of interpreta
tion. 5 There is some hope that the Supreme Court will provide further
clarification of its Establishment Clause standard in the near future.6
For now, however, it appears that the dominant mode of Establish
ment Clause analysis is the examination of a government program's

3. See, e.g., F. King Alexander & Klinton W. Alexander, The Reassertion of Church
Doctrine in American Higher Education: The Legal and Fiscal Implications of the Ex Corde
Ecclesiase for Catholic Colleges and Universities in the United States, 29 J.L. & EDUC . 149,
157 (2000) (arguing that, rather than clarifying the "proper boundaries" between church and
state, the Supreme Court "has managed to obscure it [sic), thus fueling the flames of contro
versy surrounding the issue of separation"); Ronna Greff Schneider, Getting Help with Their
Homework: Schools, Lower Courts, and the Supreme Court Justices Look for Answers Under
the Establishment Clause, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 943, 995 (2001) (hypothesizing that a "consis
tent and clear Establishment Clause jurisprudence" may not be possible for the current
Court).
4. See David H. McClamrock, Note, The First Amendment and Public Funding of Re
ligiously Controlled or Affiliated Higher Education, 17 J.C. & U.L. 381, 383 (1991) (stating
that "[t)he gloomy refrain, 'we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation' echoes
through the procession of the Supreme Court cases concerning establishment-clause limits
on aid to education" (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 603, 612 (1971))).
5. There are at least three distinct tests for evaluating government aid to religious insti
tutions. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, 704-06 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (noting
and describing the current Establishment Clause tests). (1) The pervasively sectarian test, see
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); (2) the Agostin i/modified Lemon test, see Mitchell
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995); (3) the "endorsement" test, see County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
6. In September 2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Simmons-Harris v.
Zelman, in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ohio's school voucher pro
gram violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Simmons-Harris v.
Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 976 (2001). The Court consoli-·
dated Zelman with Taylor v. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), and Hanna Perkins
School v. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court's adjudication of the school voucher issue will set
tle the conduit-financing issue. School vouchers involve an element of individual, private
choice that differs significantly from that in conduit financing. Whereas school vouchers in
volve a concrete form of intervening private choice in the decisions of each individual stu
dent and his or her family, the private choices of bond purchasers in a revenue bond issuance
are more restricted. See infra Il.B; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 841 (2000)
(O'Connor, J., concurring):
The plurality bases its holding that actual diversion is permissible on Witters and Zobrest [ci
tation omitted). Those decisions, however, rested on a significant factual premise missing
from this case, as well as from the majority of cases thus far considered by the Court involv
ing Establishment Clause challenges to school-aid programs. Specifically, we decided Witters
and Zobrest on the understanding that the aid was provided directly to the individual student
who, in tum, made the choice of where to put that aid to use. (citation omitted}.
If the Court determines that school voucher programs are constitutional, therefore, this rul
ing would not necessarily mean that programs with more limited forms of private choice are
constitutional as well.
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purpose and effect, a test first articulated in 1970 in Lemon v.
Kurtzman1 and modified over twenty years later in Agostini v. Felton.8
Generally, in assessing the constitutionality of government aid to
religious institutions, the Court looks to the aid's purpose and effect.9
Any form of government aid must have a secular purpose and an ef
fect that does not (1) result in indoctrination attributable to the gov
ernment, (2) use religious criteria to identify potential recipients, or
(3) lead to an excessive entanglement between church and state.10 In
addition to this inquiry into a program's purpose and effect, the Court
may consider whether the government aid has the purpose or effect of
endorsing religion in the eyes of a reasonable observer.11
As might be expected, lower courts have applied these guidelines
to reach widely conflicting results. One particular controversy con
cerns the eligibility of "pervasively sectarian"12 colleges to receive
government loans funded by revenue bonds.13 Revenue bonds are of
ten issued by specialized government agencies created and authorized
by statute14 to issue municipal bonds in pursuit of a particular goal,15

7. 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
8. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
9. The Court has emphasized that this analysis cannot be conducted mechanically. See,
e.g. , Tilton, 403 U.S. at 677 (plurality opinion) (stating that any Establishment Clause inquiry
"must begin with the candid acknowledgment that there is no single constitutional caliper
that can be used to measure the precise degree to which these three factors are present or
absent").
10. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989).
12. As described in Section LB, infra, the Court has used the label of pervasive sectari
anism to denote institutions in which sectarian and secular functions are so intertwined that
the government cannot provide secular aid without simultaneously advancing the institu
tion's religious agenda. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 680 (plurality opinion).
13. Generally, municipalities may issue bonds to finance improvements or projects that
are beyond their current means. See generally 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Securities and Obliga
tions§ 11 (describing municipal bonds) [hereinafter Securities and Obligations]. The issuance
of bonds must be authorized by state law. Id. § 50; see also id.§ 75.
Revenue bonds may be distinguished from general obligation bonds in that, while gen
eral obligation bonds pledge the full faith and credit of the issuing government branch, reve
nue bonds are special obligations, secured only by the revenue generated by the sponsored
project. Id. § 13 (describing general obligation and special obligation bonds). According to
the U.S. Census Bureau, the majority of municipal issuances in the United States consists of
revenue bonds. U.S. CENSUS BURE AU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2001, at 275 tbl. 432 (121st ed. 2001) [hereinafter 2001 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT) .
14. See, e.g., Educational Facilities Authority Act, CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 94100-94155
(West 1989 & Supp. 2002) (upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge in California
Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest, 526 P.2d 513 (1974)); Educational Facilities
Authority Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-109-10 to -109-180 (Law Co-op 1990 & Supp. 2001)
(upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973));
Educational Facilities Authority Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-30.39 to -30.58 (Law Co-op
2000 & Supp. 2001) (upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge in Va. Coll. Bldg.
Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 2000)).
15. See generally Public Securities and Obligations, supra note 13, § 50.
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such as the promotion of higher education.16 In such cases, the gov
ernment agency (the "authority") serves as a conduit, issuing the
bonds on behalf of a particular private entity and loaning the revenue
from the issuance to the private entity to finance a specific project or
improvement.17 The parties to this transaction typically appoint a third
party as trustee to "monitor[] the institution's payments, credit
worthiness, and compliance with terms of the loan,"18 thereby mini
mizing the role of the issuing authority in the transaction.19 This fi
nancing arrangement provides a distinct benefit to each party. Bond
purchasers benefit because interest on certain municipal securities, in
cluding revenue bonds, may be exempt from federal income taxation.20
Bond purchasers accept lower rates of return on the bonds due to this
tax exemption21 and, therefore, a private entity may finance an im
provement more cheaply than if the entity had borrowed from a pri
vate financial institution.22 By creating these incentives for both bond
purchasers and private entities, revenue bonds advance the legisla
tively mandated agenda of the issuing authority and therefore benefit
the state or local government.23

16. See 2001 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,.supra note 13, at 275 tbl. 432 (comparing issu
ances by, inter alia, state and local authorities, states, and municipalities); see also ROBERT
S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE § 3.4 (1992) [hereinafter MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW] .
17. See, e.g., Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 716-17 (M.D. Tenn. 2000)
(describing the issuance of revenue bonds); see also PAUL R. DEMURO ET AL., HEALTH
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 29.33, (2001) (describing a standard conduit transaction between
an issuer and a healthcare organization).
18. Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 687 (Va. 2000). This loan may be
funded by a completed bond sale, see, e.g. , Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 241 F.3d 501, 505
(6th Cir. 2001) (describing a revenue bond issuance in which proceeds from a completed
bond sale were loaned to the private entity), or may consist of funds "borrowed" by an issu
ing authority from the trustee, wherein the authority then transfers its interest in the loan to
the trustee. See Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
19. Steele, 1 17 F.Supp. 2d at 717.
20. See I.RC. § 103 (1988) (providing that gross income does not include interest on
state and local bonds, except as provided in § 103(b)).
21. See Stuart Lark & Mary Groves, A Change ofFocus at the Supreme Court May Lead
to Wider Availability of Tax-Exempt Financing, 11 J. TAX'N EXEMPT OROS. 1 84, 184 (2000)
(describing the issuance of tax-exempt revenue bonds).
22. See, e.g., Press Release, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Vir
ginia Supreme Court Hears Argument in Dispute over State aid for Pat Robertson's Regent
University (June 2, 2000) (estimating that the issuance considered in Lynn saved Regent
University "about $30 million in interest over the 30-year life of the loan"), at
http://www.au.org/press/pr6200.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Regent Press
Release]; see also Lark & Groves, supra note 21, at 184 (stating that, at times, "the lower
interest rate is vital to making a project financially feasible").
23. For example, the bond issuance in Lynn was issued by the Virginia College Building
Authority, an agency created to "carry out the purposes of the Educational Facilities
Authority Act." See Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 687 (citing Va. Code § 23-30.39 (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The Virginia General Assembly passed this Act in order to "enable institu
tions for higher education in the Commonwealth to provide the facilities and structures
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Recent decisions from the Virginia Supreme Court and the District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee illustrate the constitutional
dilemma that arises when pervasively sectarian institutions participate
in this sort of financing arrangement. Taxpayers in these states have
challenged revenue bond issuances that benefit religious colleges and
universities as a violation of the Establishment Clause's prohibition
against laws "respecting an establishment of religion."24 In Lynn, the
Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether Regent University
("Regent") was eligible to use proceeds generated from the Virginia
College Building Authority's issuance of revenue bonds to finance
construction projects on its campuses. After determining that Regent
was a pervasively sectarian institution25 - in other words, that religion
so infused Regent's curriculum that it was impossible for the govern
ment to separate its secular and religious functions when distributing
aid26 - the Virginia Supreme Court held that Regent could neverthe
less participate in the revenue bond program without violating the Es
tablishment Clause.27 The court reasoned that, given this conduit
financing arrangement, any funds that Regent received were not gov
ernment aid as such, that the program did not create an incentive for
students to choose religious over secular education, and that Regent
received government funds only as the result of bond purchasers' pri
vate choices.28
The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee heard a
case factually similar to Lynn but reached the opposite conclusion.29 In

which are sorely needed [to educate youth], all to the public benefit and good." Id. (quoting
Va. Code § 23-30.39 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Lark & Groves, supra note
21 at 184 (describing the social rationale behind the charitable tax exemption).
24. U.S. CONST. ·amend. I.
25. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 697-98.
26. Id. at 697. Rather than relying on the Supreme Court's articulation of the perva
sively sectarian standard, the Virginia Supreme Court looked to the literal meaning of the
words: " 'Pervasive' describes that which 'pervades or tends to pervade.' MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 868 (10th ed. 1999). 'Pervade' is defined as 'diffused
throughout every part of.' 'Sectarian' means 'of, or relating to, or characteristic of a sect.' "
Id. at 697 n.8 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 868, 1056 (10th
ed. 1999)).
27. Id. at 699.
28. See id.
29. Prior to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Johnson v. Economic Development Corp., 241
F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2001), one commentator had suggested that Johnson might resolve the
Steele/Lynn split. See Stuart J. Lark, "Pervasively Sectarian" Institutions May Now Qualify
for Tax-Exempt Financing, 12 J. TAX'N EXEMPT OROS. 173 (2001). Johnson failed to meet
this expectation, however, because the Sixth Circuit stressed that the school at issue in that
case was a merely sectarian rather than a pervasively sectarian institution. Johnson, 241 F.3d
at 510. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit expressed the belief that Hunt's prohibition against gov
ernment aid to pervasively sectarian institutions via revenue bonds remained good law. Id.
For factors informing the Sixth Circuit's determination that the school was merely sectarian,
see id. at 516-17.
·
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Steele v. Industrial Development Board,30 the district court considered
the constitutionality of a bond issuance benefiting David Lipscomb
University ("Lipscomb"), an institution much like Regent in its inte
gration of "Christian faith and practice with the pursuit of academic
excellence."31 As in Lynn, the district court found that Lipscomb was
pervasively sectarian.32 Unlike the Virginia Supreme Court, however,
the district court held that the revenue bonds were a direct benefit
from the state and, consequently, that the bond issuance had the im
permissible effect of advancing religion.33
The only Supreme Court opinion to address this controversy di
rectly appears, at first glance, to support the district court's conclusion
in Steele. In Hunt v. McNair,34 the Supreme Court held that a revenue
bond issuance benefiting a sectarian institution did not violate the Es
tablishment Clause,35 but noted that conduit financing would have the
effect of advancing religion when used to fund a loan for a pervasively
sectarian institution.36 The underlying logic of Hunt, and the major
constitutional concern of the pervasively sectarian standard, is that
when a college is so sectarian in nature that its religious mission in
fuses any otherwise secular activity, it is impossible for the govern
ment to ensure that aid flows only to the institution's secular func
tions.37
While Hunt's standard is unambiguous, the case may no longer be
good law. In the almost thirty years since Hunt, the Supreme Court's
approach to Establishment Clause issues, as well as its understanding
of when the government may provide aid to religious institutions, has
undergone dramatic transformation.38 In order to address the
Lynn/Steele split, then, it is necessary to reconsider the constitutional
ity of conduit-financing arrangements that benefit private, pervasively
sectarian colleges in light of the Court's recent j urisprudence.

30. 117 F. Supp. 2d 693 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
31. Id. at 694.
32. Id. at 710.
33. Id. at 720.
34. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
35. Id. at 736.
36. Id. at 743:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to
an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are
subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an oth
erwise substantially secular setting.
37. See, e.g., id. at 744 (noting that the issuance of revenue bonds would not support the
school's religious functions because any projects funded through revenue bonds could not be
used for religious purposes); id. at 749 (stating that the Act under which the bonds are is
sued, as well as the Authority's rules and the College's proposal, all limit the government's
aid to "the secular aspects of this liberal arts college").
38. See Section I.A. infra.
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This Note argues that a government authority does not violate the
Establishment Clause by issuing revenue bonds to finance a loan to a
pervasively sectarian institution because such aid does not involve
public funds, is neutrally available, and entails only a minimal and
largely indirect relationship between the government and the perva
sively sectarian institution.39 Part I argues that, although Hunt v.
McNair once settled this issue, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have undermined two logical predicates of the pervasively sectarian
test, thereby requiring courts to use pervasive sectarianism as a factor
in the overall Establishment Clause determination rather than as a
presumptive invalidation of government aid. Part II explains that
revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions do
not advance religion according to the Supreme Court's current stan
dard. Finally, Part III examines the ultimate church-state relationship
in conduit financing, and argues that because recipients of revenue
bonds do not receive public funds as such and because the government
has only a minimal role in the bond issue, any church-state relation
ship arising from conduit financing arrangements does not rise to an
unconstitutional level of entanglement. This Part also applies the en
dorsement test to show that the only act of real constitutional signifi
cance - the authority's approval of a revenue bond issuance that
would benefit a pervasively sectarian institution - is not an endorse
ment of religion. This Note concludes that the unique character of a
revenue bond issuance allows pervasively sectarian institutions to par
ticipate in this government activity without violating the Establish
ment Clause.
I.

T HE ONGOING EVOLUTION OF THE PERYAS IVELY S ECTARIAN
T EST

This Part contends that the constitutional validity of revenue bond
issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions is an open ques
tion, despite a series of Supreme Court decisions that, at first glance,
suggest the contrary. Section I.A outlines the basic constitutional prin
ciples and the application of those principles through the pervasively
sectarian standard in Tilton v. Richardson,40 Hunt v. McNair,41 and

39. This argument assumes that any university benefiting from conduit financing re
frains (or agrees to refrain) from engaging in discrimination that would raise a separate
Fourteenth Amendment or human rights issue. See Dave Ahearn, Gay Rights Ruling May
Break Impasse over Bond Issue for Georgetown U., BOND B UYER, Jan. 14, 1988, at 1 (re
porting that Georgetown University's refusal to grant equal rights to gay student groups - a
violation of a district human rights law - had impeded the approval of a revenue bond issu
ance for the university's benefit).
40. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
41. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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Roemer v. Board of Public Works.42 This Section argues that the main
impetus behind the pervasively sectarian standard is twofold: it de
pends both on the presumption that an institution's religious functions
are inseparable from its secular ones, and that actual diversion of gov
ernment funds to religious indoctrination is always impermissible. Sec
tion l.B contends that the Court's Establishment Clause j urisprudence
since the "Tilton trilogy"43 has significantly undermined these predi
cates for the pervasively sectarian standard by overruling the pre
sumption that certain institutions will divert secular aid to religious
purposes and by allowing the diversion of government aid in certain
cases. Thus, according to the Supreme Court's current standard, the
question is not whether the government may aid pervasively sectarian
institutions but rather under what conditions the government may aid
such institutions.
A.

Diversion as the Root of the Pervasively Sectarian Inquiry

This Section explores the j urisprudential origins of the pervasively
sectarian test, and argues that it is based on two prior assumptions:
first, that the religious and secular functions of certain institutions are
inseparable and, second, that actual diversion of government aid is
impermissible in all circumstances. The pervasively sectarian test has
its roots in the fundamental mandate of the First Amendment: that the
government "shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig
ion. "44 Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court, elaborated upon
this principle in an oft-quoted passage from Everson v. Board of Edu
cation: the First Amendment means that a state cannot "pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an
other. . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice relig
ion. "45 Notwithstanding the absolutist language of Everson, the
Supreme Court has never held that all financial aid to religious institu
tions violates the Establishment Clause.46 Rather, the "crucial ques
tion" posed by the Establishment Clause is whether the primary effect

42. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
43. Marjorie Reiley Maguire, Comment, Having One's Cake and Eating It Too: Gov
ernment Funding and Religious Exemptions for Religiously Affiliated Colleges and Universi
ties, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1072 (using the "Tilton trilogy" label to describe Tilton, Hunt,
and Roemer).
44.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

45. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
46. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971) (plurality opinion of Burger,
C.J.) (citing Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), in which the Court upheld federal aid
to a hospital run by a religious order).
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of a legislative program advances religion.47 The Court has answered
this question by determining whether the legislative program will "re
sult in government indoctrination," "define its recipients by reference
to religion," or "create an excessive entanglement [between church
and state]. "48
The Supreme Court developed the pervasively sectarian standard
as a shortcut to the ultimate constitutional question of whether gov
ernment aid advances religion. Tilton v. Richardson, which the Court
decided on the same day in 1971 as Lemon v. Kurtzman,49 marked the
first application of the pervasively sectarian standard to a government
program aiding religious universities. In Tilton, the Court considered
the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, which provided federal
grants and loans to colleges for the construction of academic facili
ties.so Taxpayers in Connecticut challenged the distribution of federal
aid under this statute because of the participation of four "church
related" colleges and universities.s1 A plurality of the Court found that
the Act advanced a purely secular purpose,s2 noting with approval that
the Act itself required recipients to use federal funds for secular ends,
and that past recipients were obligated to return the aid upon a finding
that it had been diverted to religious uses.s3 In so holding, the plurality
rejected the taxpayers' contention that the nature of the recipient uni
versities was such that it would be impossible for government aid to
serve a purely secular purpose - that "religion so permeate[d] the
secular education provided by church-related colleges and universities
that their religious and secular educational functions [were] in fact in
separable."s4 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, rejected
the factual premise of this assertion by examining the recipient univer
sities' actual use of the federally funded buildings,ss and by gauging the

47. Id. at 679.
48. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 845 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describ
ing this three-pronged inquiry). This current test modifies the Court's original test, first ar
ticulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), and asks whether the statute in
question has a secular purpose, whether its primary effect a dvances or inhibits religion, and
whether the statute fosters an excessive entanglement between government and religion.
49. 403 U.S 602 (1971). Both were decided on June 28, 1971. Id.; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 672.
50. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 675.
51. Id. at 676.
52. Id. at 680 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
53. Id. at 679-80 (plurality opinion).
54. Id. at 680 (plurality opinion).
55. Id. at 681 (plurality opinion):
Two of the five federally financed buildings involved in this case are libraries. The District
Court found that no classes had been conducted in either of these facilities and that no re
strictions were imposed by the institutions on the books that they acquired. There is no evi
dence to the contrary. The third building was a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus
College. The evidence showed that this facility was used solely to assist students with their
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degree to which religion restricted academic freedom at the recipient
universities.56 The plurality found that religion had not, in fact,
"seep[ed] into the use of any of these facilities,"57 and that the schools
allowed for a sufficient level of academic freedom.58
Several aspects of the Tilton analysis are significant in light of the
Supreme Court's later Establishment Clause j urisprudence. First, the
Court looked to the actual use of the federally financed buildings and
rejected the validity of considering instead a "composite profile" of a
sectarian institution.59 Second, the Court's inquiry into the religious
character of the school was aimed at determining whether the school
was so religious that the government could not ensure that secular aid
remained secular once distributed to recipients. Thus, the key issue in
the Court's analysis - and the focus of what the Court would later
formulate as the pervasively sectarian test - was the theoretical sepa
rability of religious and secular educational functions.60 Third, it is sig
nificant that Tilton dismissed one of the arguments often made by op
ponents of government aid to religious institutions: that aiding the
secular functions of a religious college would indirectly advance its re
ligious functions by freeing resources for use in religious education.
Tilton states that, where the government can directly aid a school's
secular functions without simultaneously giving direct aid to its relig
ious functions, it is of no consequence that this aid may provide inci
dental benefit to the institution's religious functions.61 This conclusion
follows logically from the principle that the Lemon/Agostini test looks
only to the primary effect of government aid.62
While Tilton hinted at the relevance of pervasive sectarianism,
Hunt v. McNair63 cemented the principle that the pervasively sectarian
test may serve as a shortcut for the Lemon inquiry. In Hunt, the Court
applied the pervasively sectarian test in order to determine whether

pronunciation in modern foreign languages - a use which would seem peculiarly unrelated
and unadaptable to religious indoctrination. Federal grants were also used to build a science
building at Fairfield University and a music, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College.
56. Id. at 680-82 (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 681 (plurality opinion). While the Supreme Court did not find that the partici
pation of the "church-related colleges" violated the Establishment Clause, it did hold that
the Act violated the First Amendment by limiting the government's interest - and thus the
requirement that the federally financed facilities be used only for secular purposes - to a
twenty-year period. Id. at 683.
58. Id. at 681 (plurality opinion).
59. See id. at 682 (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 680 (plurality opinion).
61. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (citing Tilton for the proposition that
"the Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to
one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends").
62. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679 (plurality opinion).
63. Hunt, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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government aid - in this case, a loan financed by a revenue bond is
suance - was likely to be diverted to the institution's religious func
tions.64 Because the revenue bond issuance considered in Hunt was not
yet complete at the time of litigation, the Court was unable to examine
the college's actual use of the loan and had to consider only whether
the recipient college was "oriented significantly towards sectarian
rather than secular education."65 Justice Powell, writing for a majority
of the Court, initially used Ti/ton's pervasively sectarian analysis as a
prima facie test for the advancement prong of the Lemon analysis:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing re
ligion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that
a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mis
sion or when it funds a s ecifically religious activity in an otherwise sub
stantially secular setting. 6

£

The Court concluded that neither the character of the recipient, the
Baptist College at Charleston, nor Baptist College's likely use of the
aid raised any constitutional concerns.67
Hunt expanded on Tilton by applying the pervasively sectarian
analysis to the entanglement prong of the Lemon test as well as to the
advancement prong. The entanglement analysis, at least in its "ad
ministrative entanglement" mode,68 begins with the same fundamental
concern as the advancement analysis: the government may aid relig
ious institutions only if those institutions refrain from using secular aid
to indoctrinate students. The Court considered the degree to which
the recipient college was sectarian in order to determine whether such
diversion was likely.69 In the Court's view, "the degree of entangle
ment . . . varies in large measure with the extent to which religion
permeates the institution."70 As the Court had already stated in
Lemon, certain religious schools cannot participate in government
programs without an oversight mechanism to ensure that government
aid is not diverted to religious indoctrination.71 This degree of surveil
lance may lead to an unconstitutional degree of government-church
entanglement.72 The Court found in Hunt, however, that no such wide-

64. Id. at 736.
65. Id. at 744.
66. Id. at 743.
67. Id. at 744.
68. For a description of the two modes of entanglement analysis in Lemon, see
1588 (3d ed. 1996).

GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

69. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 746 & n.8.
70. Id. at 746.
71. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971).
72. See id. ("The substantial religious character of these church-related schools gives rise
to entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid.").
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spread supervision was necessary to ensure that aid to Baptist College
remained secular in effect.73
Given Hunt's holding that the Establishment Clause did not bar a
merely sectarian university from benefiting from the issuance of reve
nue bonds,74 its real significance for the present analysis is the implica
tion that the Establishment Clause does prohibit a pervasively sectar
ian university from benefiting from revenue bonds.75 The Supreme
Court recognized the full import of Hunt three years later in Roemer
v. Board of Public Works.76 A plurality of the Court held in Roem�r
that a Maryland program providing an annual subsidy to colleges and
universities - including four Roman Catholic colleges - did not vio
late the First Amendment.77 Central to the Court's holding was the de
termination that the institutions at issue were not pervasively sectar
ian.78 With regard to the advancement prong of the Lemon test, the
Blackmun plurality stated that any aid "flowing directly to such 're
ligion pervasive institutions' [such as those considered in Lemon and
Meek v. Pittenger79] had the primary effect of advancing religion."80 As
for the entanglement prong, the Roemer plurality found that "Hunt
requires {l) that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so 'perva
sively sectarian' that secular activities cannot be separated from sec
tarian ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be separated out, they
1
alone may be funded. "8
The significance of this precedent in a given case, of course, de
pends on whether the Court is likely to find that a particular institu
tion is pervasively sectarian. Throughout the Tilton trilogy, the Court
looked to a consistent set of factors in making this determination. The
degree of academic freedom that prevails on the college or university's
campus is central to the Court's analysis.82 In both Tilton and Roemer,

73. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 746.
74. Id. at 749.
75. See, e.g., Alexander & Alexander, supra note 3 at 164 (noting that Hunt "allowed for
the possibility that an Establishment Gause violation may exist where public money is dis
tributed to support institutions that are 'pervasively sectarian' ").
76. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
77. Id. at 767 (plurality opinion).
78. Id. at 762 (plurality opinion) (finding that the colleges provided "distinct and separable" secular educational functions).
79. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
80. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 753 (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 366).
81. Id. at 755 (plurality opinion) (italics in original).
82. See id. at 756 (plurality opinion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 747 n.8 (1973);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681-82 (1971); see also Hunt, 413 U.S. at 747 (noting that
the college in question did not place particular emphasis on sectarian education); Maguire,
supra note 43 (arguing, inter alia, that academic freedom, itself a constitutional right, has
played a vital role in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause analysis).
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the Court noted that the recipient institutions "subscribe[d) to, and
abide[d) by, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom
of the American Association of University Professors."83 The Court
also examined the institutions' selection of faculty and students, look
ing favorably upon colleges and universities that hired faculty and ad
mitted students without regard to religious affiliation.84 In addition,
the Court considered whether religious activities such as chapel atten
dance and prayer were mandatory, suggesting that a lack of compul
sory religious exercises indicates that a school is merely sectarian
rather than pervasively sectarian.85 Finally, the Court inquired into the
recipient-university's "institutional autonomy," or the degree to which
religious authority dominates the university's administration.86 Even in
the Tilton trilogy, mere affiliation with a religious order was not
enough to j ustify a finding of pervasive sectarianism. Indeed, in Tilton
and Hunt, the Court noted that a religious authority governed the in
stitutions in question but, due to the other factors in the analysis, this
governance did not rise to the level of pervasive sectarianism.87 Relig
ious governance appears to raise constitutional concerns only when it
limits the field of academic inquiry, results in religious qualifications
for admission to the academic community, or turns secular education
into a vehicle for religious proselytization.88
According to the Supreme Court's analysis in Roemer, Hunt, and
Tilton, the presence of these factors indicates that the institution in
question is so religious in orientation that its religious and secular

83. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 756 (plurality opinion); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681-82 (plurality
opinion) (finding that, although the four colleges in question had "certain religious restric
tions on what could be taught," these policies were not enforced but were instead super
seded by an "atmosphere of academic freedom"); see also Stephen V. Monsma, The "Perva
sively Sectarian" Standard in Theory and Practice, 13 N.D. J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321
(1999); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Colleges & Universities § 39, at 310-11 (2000) (listing four factors
relevant to the determination of whether a college or university is pervasively sectarian).
84. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 757-58 (plurality opinion); Hunt, 413 U.S. at 742, 743-44, 746;
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion).
85. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755-56 (plurality opinion) (noting nonmandatory chapel and
prayers in a " 'minuscule' percentage" of classes); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 682 (plurality opinion)
(observing that mandatory attendance at chapel was an element of the appellants' "compos
ite" institution but was not a requirement at the actual colleges and universities under consideration).
·

86. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755 (plurality opinion) (quoting Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub.Works,
387 F. Supp. 1282, 1287 n.7 (D. Md. 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hunt, 413
U.S. at 747-48, Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion).
87. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743 (noting, inter alia, that members of the college's board of trus
tees were elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (plural
ity opinion) (stating that each college in question was "governed by Catholic religious or
ganizations").
88. See, e.g. , Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755-56 (plurality opinion); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686-87
(plurality opinion). This principle is evident in the very definition of pervasive sectarianism,
as it includes those universities where "a substantial portion of their functions are subsumed
in the religious mission." Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743 (emphasis added).
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functions are inseparable, pushing the college or university outside the
realm of secular academics. As the Court recognized in its later Es
tablishment Clause cases, underlying this concept of pervasive sectari
anism is the presumption that such institutions will use secular aid, in
tentionally or unintentionally, to support their sectarian activities.89
The preceding analysis suggests that this presumption is based on the
more fundamental notion that such diversion is always impermissible
under the Establishment Clause. Tilton, Roemer, and Hunt, therefore,
appear to offer a quick resolution to the present inquiry. If those deci
sions reflect the current Court's Establishment Clause standard, per
vasively sectarian institutions are prohibited from participating in
revenue bond issuances.
B.

Mitchell v . Helms: The Need to Revisit Hunt v . McNair

There is a growing sense among observers of the Court's Estab
lishment Clause jurisprudence that the Tilton trilogy's pervasively sec
tarian analysis may be obsolete.90 Numerous commentators have noted
that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause standard has evolved
a great deal over the last decade and that the Court may reshape the
nature of Establishment Clause inquiry in the near future.91 These
commentators find ample support for their position in Mitchell v.
Helms,92 decided in June, 2000. In Mitchell, the Court approved of a
federal program that loaned funds to local education agencies, which
then provided educational materials such as audiovisual equipment to
primary and secondary schools - including private, religious schools.93
A plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, emphasized
the neutral, secular criteria by which the government distributed aid94

89. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 844-49 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also Lark, supra note 29, at 179 (arguing that, in rejecting the presumption of divertibility in
Agostini, Justice O'Connor eliminated the logical predicate of the pervasively sectarian doc
trine).
90. See, e.g., Lark, supra note 29, at 179 (noting that the plurality in Mitchell
expressly rejected the pervasively sectarian test and arguing that Agostini had already
rejected the test's underlying presumption); Edsell M. Eady Jr. & James D. Nguyen,
Using "Benign Neutrality" to Bring Low-Cost Municipal Bond Financing to
Church-Sponsored K-12 Schools, CHURCH Bus. (Apr. 2000), available at
http://www.churchbusiness.com/articles/0411egal.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) (promoting
a "benign neutrality" analysis in place of the pervasively sectarian test).
91. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 3; Ola Kinnander, NABL Lawyers Optimistic About
Future of Bonds for Religious Schools, BOND BUYER, Feb. 20, 2001, at 5.
92. 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding that private Catholic schools could participate in a fed
eral program providing secular educational materials to elementary and secondary schools);
see also Freedman, supra note 3, at 329-30 (describing the procedural history of Mitchell).
93. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802-03 (plurality opinion).
94. See, e.g. , id. at 810 (plurality opinion).
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and the role of "numerous private choices" in allocating this aid,95 ul
timately holding that these two factors indicated the aid was neutral
toward religion in the sense mandated by the First Amendment.96
More significantly, the plurality claimed that it was time for the
Court to overrule certain presumptions that, although once well es
tablished in the Court's Establishment Clause j urisprudence, had sub
sequently eroded. The Mitchell plurality contended, first, that the rule
against diversion97 of government aid "is inconsistent with [the
Court's] more recent case law and is unworkable."98 When govern
ment aid is secular in content and neutrally available,· the plurality
viewed it as irrelevant to the constitutional analysis that recipients
might divert that aid to religious education.99 Noting that the Court
had already expressed a lack of concern for divertibility in Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind1 00 and Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District, 1 01 the plurality argued that, in any
case, divertibility has no real connection to the core constitutional is
sue:
A concern for divertibility, as opposed to improper content, is misplaced
not only because it fails to explain why the sort of aid that we have al
lowed is permissible, but also because it is boundless - enveloping all

aid, no matter how trivial - and thus has only the most attenuated ( if
any ) link to any realistic concern for preventing an "establishment of re
"1
ligion. 02

The preceding analysis of the Tilton trilogy suggests that, in re
j ecting any concern for divertibility, the Mitchell plurality thereby did
away with any possible rationale for applying the pervasively sectarian
test.103 The plurality indeed concluded that this test is outmoded,104 but
gave four different reasons for its obsolescence. First, the plurality

95. See, e.g. , id. (plurality opinion) ("As a way of assuring neutrality, we have repeatedly
considered whether any governmental aid that goes to a religious institution does so 'only as
a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of individuals.' " (internal citations
omitted)).
96. Id. at 829 (plurality opinion).
97. Diversion may be defined in this context as "the use of governmental aid to further a
religious message." Id. at 821 (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 820 (plurality opinion).
99. Id. (plurality opinion).
100. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
101. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
102. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 824 (plurality opinion).
103. See supra Part I.A.
104. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826 ("[T)here was a period when [pervasive sectarianism) mat
tered, particularly if the pervasively sectarian school was a primary or secondary school. But
that period is one that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long past." (citation omit
ted)). Freedman states that this claim "abandoned years of established precedent." Freed
man, supra note 3, at 334.
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noted its relevance was "in sharp decline,"105 as the Court had not re
lied on divertibility as a factor in rejecting an aid program since
1985.106 Second, the plurality argued that an aid recipient's religious
proclivities are irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. 1 07 That is,
when the government advances its secular agenda with a program al
locating aid on a neutral basis, "it is a mystery which view of religion
the government has established, and thus a mystery what the constitu
tional violation would be."108 Third, the plurality contended that the
pervasively sectarian label is "offensive," as is judicial examination of
an aid recipient's religious beliefs.109 In a final, related objection, the
plurality argued that this categorization has a "shameful pedigree" of
hostility toward Catholicism, concluding that a doctrine "born of big
otry" no longer has a place in the Court's Establishment Clause j uris
prudence. 1 1 0
The plurality's proposed mode of Establishment Clause analysis
would mark a significant transition - or, for some commentators, a
" [s]eismic disturbance"m - in the Court's approach to government
aid to religious schools. Indeed, a majority of the Justices expressed
opposition to the plurality's view of the Establishment Clause. Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, written in response to the "unprecedented
breadth" of the plurality's Establishment Clause standard,112 argued
that actual diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.113 She maintained that
Witters and Zobrest, two cases relied upon by the plurality, permit di
version of government aid only because of the overriding role of indi
vidual choice in allocating that aid. 1 14 For Justice O'Connor, diversion

105. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826 (plurality opinion).
106. Id. (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 827-28 (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 827 (plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 828 (plurality opinion).
1 10. Id. at 828-29 (plurality opinion).
1 1 1 . Jason S. Marks, Only a "Speed Bump" Separating Church and State?, 57 J. Mo. B.
36, 43 (2001); see also Charles J. Russo & David L. Gregory, The Constitutional Vitality of
Ex Corde Ecclesiae and A [sic} Response to the Alexander's Despair, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 307,
314-15(2001) (claiming that Mitchell "effectively dismantled" the metaphorical "wall of
separation" between church and state).
1 12. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
1 13. Id. at 840. Justice O'Connor cites Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), as sup
porting this prohibition against diversion. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concur
ring). She notes that, while the Bowen Court determined that the statute in question was
constitutional "on its face," id. at 841, the Court remanded the case for the district court to
determine whether there was evidence of any actual diversion. This concern for actual diver
sion rather than potential or likely diversion is central to Justice O'Connor's Establishment
Clause analysis.
1 14. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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violates the Establishment Clause when the government provides a
"direct subsidy," but may be permissible when the aid is "more akin to
the government issuing a paycheck to an employee who, in tum, do
nates a portion of that check to a religious institution. "115
Unlike Justice Souter, who argued in dissent that the assumptions
underlying the pervasively sectarian standard have continuing rele
vance,1 16 Justice O 'Connor rejected the presumption that certain re
ligious schools will use government aid for religious purposes. She
cited Agostini for the proposition that "it would be inappropriate to
presume inculcation of religion; rather, plaintiffs raising an Establish
ment Clause challenge must present evidence that the government aid
in question has resulted in religious indoctrination. " 1 17 While Justice
O'Connor did not thereby overrule the root of the pervasively sectar
ian test - the belief that diversion is impermissible under all circum
stances - her concurrence did reject one of the predicates for the test:
the presumption that certain religiously affiliated institutions are in
herently prone to diverting secular government aid to religious indoc
trination.118
Mitchell points to several factors in the Court's recent Establish
ment Clause j urisprudence suggesting that an institution's pervasive
sectarianism is only one factor for the Court to weigh in determining
the constitutionality of government aid. Specifically, four trends in the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence indicate the Tilton tril
ogy's approach to aid benefiting pervasively sectarian colleges and
universities warrants a fresh look.
First, as suggested by both the plurality and the concurring Justices
in Mitchell, the Supreme Court has held that, in certain circumstances,
actual diversion of government aid does not violate the Establishment
Clause.119 Although Justices O'Connor and Breyer disagree with the

1 15. Id.
116. Justice Souter applies the pervasively sectarian standard, arguing that, where a
school is unable to separate its religious teaching from secular education, "direct govern
ment subsidies to such schools are prohibited because they will inevitably and impermissibly
support religious indoctrination." Id. at 837 (Souter, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 858 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 18. See Lark, supra note 29. Lark argues that, although Justice O'Connor did not reject
the pervasively sectarian inquiry 'entirely, "[s]he did, however, reject the presumption on
which the analysis depends" - namely, that secular aid will be diverted to religious uses at
particular schools. Id. at 9. He notes later, however, that Justice O'Connor may invalidate a
program if she found evidence of diversion: Id. This prediction is in line with the analysis in
Section I.A, which contends that the pervasively sectarian test depends not only on the pre
sumption that diversion is inevitable but also on the principle that such diversion is always
impermissible. Because Justice O'Connor does not reject this latter principle as well, her
Mitchell concurrence does not completely undermine the pervasively sectarian test. A ma
j ority of the Court, therefore, currently supports some sort of pervasive sectarianism inquiry.
119. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820 (plurality opinion); id. at 855-56 (O'Connor, J., joined
by Breyer, J., concurring).
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Mitchell plurality as to the overall significance of Witters and Zobrest
for the governing Establishment Clause test, both sides agree that
Witters and Zobrest are, in fact, examples of permissible diversion of
government aid.120 For Mitchell's plurality, a religious institution's sec
tarian use of ostensibly secular aid is permissible when diverted aid is
itself devoid of religious content and the government has allocated aid
without regard for recipients' religious affiliation.121 The concurring
Justices take a somewhat harder line, arguing that the Court approved
the diversion of government aid in Witters and Zobrest only because
" [a]ny aid . . . that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so
only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of
aid recipients."122 Despite this difference, the plurality and the concur
ring Justices both reject the rule "that all government aid that directly
assists the educational function of religious schools is invalid."123
In dismissing this rule, even if this rejection was subject to a num
ber of qualifications, the Court undermined one of the fundamental
predicates of the pervasively sectarian test. As described in Section
I.A, the Court's reluctance to aid pervasively sectarian institutions is
rooted in the principle that government aid must not, under any cir
cumstances, fund religious activities.124 It is this logic that supports the
rule in Hunt "that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so 'per
vasively sectarian' that secular activities cannot be separated from sec
tarian ones, and . . . that if secular activities can be separated out, they
alone may be funded."125 The Court's finding that diversion does not
violate the Establishment Clause in certain circumstances means, at
least, that a court faced with a revenue bond issuance benefiting a per
vasively sectarian institution must determine anew the extent to which
that transaction satisfies the requirements of neutrality and private
choice.
Second, the Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence
highlights the fact that there may be variations in the distribution of
government aid that mitigate constitutional concerns. This attention to
the particular form of aid is nothing new in the Court's Establishment

120. Mitchell's plurality makes this point as well. Id. at 820-21.
121. Id. at 820 ("So long as the governmental aid is not itself 'unsuitable for use in the
public schools because of religious content' and eligibility for aid is determined in a constitu
tionally permissible manner, any use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the
government and is thus not of constitutional concern." (internal citation omitted)).
122. Id. (O'Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't
of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (altera
tion in original)).
123. Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225
(1997) (internal citation marks omitted)).
124. See supra Section I.A.
1 25. Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.736, 755 (1976) (plurality opinion) (de
scribing Hunt's requirements).
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Clause analysis. It was, after all, a determinative factor in the Court's
holding in Everson v. Board of Education that a New Jersey program
allowing a board of education to reimburse parents for their children's
bus transportation to religious schools did not violate the Establish
ment Clause.126 Possible variations in distribution of government aid
have taken on increasing significance, however, as the Court's opin
ions in Zobrest and Witters stressed the importance of indirect distri
bution in rendering an otherwise impermissible diversion of govern
ment aid valid under the Establishment Clause. 1 27 The Court
articulated the indirect/direct distinction in Witters as that between a
transfer similar to a "hypothetical salary donation," in which a gov
ernment employee donates a portion of her paycheck to a religious in
stitution, and "an impermissible 'direct subsidy,' " in which the gov
ernment provides financial assistance directly to that religious
institution.128 The former transaction, even when it results in indirect
financial assistance to an institution's religious mission, passes consti
tutional muster because a private individual, rather than the govern
ment, has distributed government aid to that religious institution.129
Although Justices have described the relevance of the form of distri
bution in different ways,1 30 the Court has consistently found that the
manner in which government aid reaches the beneficiary may take on
an important role in the constitutional analysis.
While the Court considered a revenue bond issuance in Hunt v.
McNair, the Court did not rely on the indirectness of a loan funded by
revenue bonds in that case to determine that the aid in question was
consistent with the Establishment Clause. In a lengthy footnote, how
ever, the Court noted that government aid through revenue bonds was
fundamentally unlike a direct subsidy.131 The "only state aid," accord
ing to the Court, is the initial "creation of an instrumentality" author
ized to issue revenue bonds.132 Given the importance of the indirect

126. 330 U.S. 1 3, 18 (1947) (noting that the aid in question is received by parents rather
than parochial schools); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621(1971) (distinguishing
Everson and Allen).
127. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993); Witters, 474 U.S.
at 488.
128. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
129. See id.
130. Justice Souter, dissenting in Mitchell, framed this distinction in terms of a di
rect/indirect inquiry, which allows the Court to observe "distinctions between government
schemes with individual beneficiaries and those whose beneficiaries in the first instance
might be religious schools." Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 888 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Mitchell's plurality, on the other hand, prefers to view the direct/indirect distinction in terms
of private choice. Id. at 816 (plurality opinion).
131. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 745 n.7 (1973).
132. Id. The Hunt footnote is quoted in full in Section III.A. See infra text accompany
ing note 236.
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character of government aid in Zobrest and Witters, the "special"133 na
ture of loans funded by an issuance of revenue bonds may warrant re
newed consideration.
Third, the Court has undermined two presumptions that had pre
viously shaped Establishment Clause j urisprudence and the perva
sively sectarian standard in particular. The Court expressly recognized
the demise of these presumptions in Agostini v. Felton.134 First, the
Court discarded the assumption that the placement of government
employees in parochial schools "inevitably results in the impermissible
effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic un
ion between government and religion."135 At first glance, this state
ment would seem to have little impact on the present analysis because
the use of public employees by students at parochial schools is a dif
ferent form of aid than a loan financed by tax-exempt revenue bonds.
A closer look at the Court's statement in Agostini suggests, however,
that the Court is calling into question the validity of such presump
tions in general. While the question posed in Agostini and Zobrest had
to do with an individual's compliance with the terms of her employ
ment, this question is related to the issue of whether an institution will
abide by the terms of its loan. There is no clear reason why Agostini's
evidentiary requirement should not extend to the latter as well as the
former. In this sense, the Court's elimination of the "symbolic union"
presumption has important repercussions, as the Court is now less
willing to assume that diversion of secular aid funded by a revenue
bond issuance will take place at a pervasively sectarian institution, and
will instead require evidence to that effect.136
In addition, the Court rejected the rule "that all government aid
that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is in
valid. " 1 37 This conclusion stemmed from two prior determinations. The
Court decided that allowing a student to use neutrally available gov
ernment aid, such as Zobrest's sign-language interpreter, at a religious
school was "no different" from allowing a state employee to give a
portion of her paycheck to a religious institution, given the intervening

133. Id.
134. 521 U.S. 203, 223-30 (1997).
135. Id. at 223.
136. In Justice O'Connor's words, "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we as
sumed instead that the interpreter (in Zobrest] would dutifully discharge her responsibilities
as a full-time public employee and comply with the ethical guidelines of her profession by
accurately translating what was said." Id. at 224 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12 (1997)).
137. Id. at 225. Although this section of Agostini may be read as "mark(ing] the death of
the direct/indirect distinction," see Freedman, supra note 3, 91 at 333, this "death" amounts
only to the demise of the presumptive validity of indirect aid and the presumptive invalidity
of indirect aid. The method of aid - indeed, its "directness" - still factors in the Court's
Establishment Clause analysis. Id.
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role of private choice in either case.138 The Court also determined that
the presence of a government employee such as Zobrest's sign
language interpreter on the grounds of a religious school supported
neither the presumption. that the interpreter would indoctrinate the
student by manipulating her role as an interpreter, nor the finding of a
symbolic union between church and state.1 39 In effect, the Court con
cluded that the First Amendment did not prevent a private individual
from using secular, neutrally available government aid in the manner
of her choice and that the Court could not presume, without evidence
to the contrary, that a religious institution would take advantage of
that individual's private choice to indoctrinate her. Although the pro
vision of government aid therefore had the effect of facilitating relig
ious education in some cases, it did so without violating the Estab
lishment Clause.
Finally, the increasing importance of neutrality in the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause j urisprudence suggests that the constitu
tionality of revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian
institutions warrants a fresh look. In Justice O'Connor's words, the
Court has "taken a more forgiving view of neutral government pro
grams that make aid available generally without regard to the religious
or nonreligious character of the recipient school. "140 Behind this "more
forgiving view" is the rationale that, when the government makes a
particular form of aid available to anyone regardless of his or her re
ligious affiliation, the government does not have a meaningful role in
any indoctrination that may take place as the result of the recipient's
use of that aid.141 This factor, along with the aid recipient's intervening
choice, contributed to a finding of constitutionality in Witters,1 42
Zobrest, 1 43 and Agostini, 1 44 and was trumpeted by the Mitchell plurality
as central to the determination that a given form of government aid

138. Agostini, 512 U.S. at 226.
139. Id. at 226-27.
140. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 847 (2000) (O'Connor, J. concurring); see also id.
at 809 (plurality opinion) ("In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to
the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neu
trality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to
their religion.").
141. Id. (plurality opinion).
142. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986) (finding
that the program in question was generally available without regard to the sectarian or non
sectarian character of the institution benefited).
143. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1997) (stating that Witters'
logic with regard to the program's neutrality could be applied in Zobrest "with e qual force").
144. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231-32 (noting that, like the aid approved in Zobrest, Title I
remedial instructors are available to students "at whatever school they choose to attend").
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does not violate the Establishment Clause.145 In contrast, the neutral
availability of revenue bonds played no role in Hunt v. McNair.146
These four developments in the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause j urisprudence mean that the pervasively sectarian analysis may
be out of step with the Court's current understanding of the Estab
lishment Clause. That is not to say, however, that the concept of per
vasive sectarianism is no longer significant in Establishment Clause
analysis or that the degree of religiosity at an institution benefiting
from a government program is irrelevant. Rather, the Court's renun
ciation of the principles upon which the pervasively sectarian standard
is based means that pervasive sectarianism can no longer be applied as
a presumptive disqualification of certain institutions from participa
tion in government programs. Certain schools may raise special Es
tablishment Clause concerns because, although courts must presume
that these schools will abide by the contractual terms of government
aid,147 the court may find nevertheless that a religious agenda infuses
every classroom and every ostensibly secular subject.148 In such cases, a
more nuanced inquiry is called for - one that reflects the current
state of the Court's Establishment Clause j urisprudence.149
II.

A IDING RELIGIOUS UNIVERSITIES WITHOUT ADVANCING
RELIGION

This Part argues that revenue bond issues benefiting pervasively
sectarian colleges possess the neutrality and intervening private
choices that the Supreme Court has required in its recent Establish-

145. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (describing the roles of neutrality and private choice in
the Court's prior Establishment Clause cases).
146. Admittedly, the present inquiry presents an issue somewhat different than the
Supreme Court's prior neutrality cases. In Zobrest, Witters, and Agostini, the government aid
was neutrally available to individual students, regardless of what school each chose to attend.
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (aid in the form of a sign language interpreter); Witters, 474 U.S. at 483
(aid in the form of vocational rehabilitation assistance); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209-10 (aid in
the form of remedial instruction). In the case of conduit-financing transactions, the govern
ment aid - revenue bonds - would be neutrally available to institutions, regardless of re
ligious affiliation. The neutral availability of government aid must, therefore, have a some
what different effect in determining the constitutionality of revenue bond issuances
benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions.
147. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d at 710-16 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (de
scribing Lipscomb University); Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 684-86 (Va.
2000) (describing Regent University).
149. As suggested by Section I.B, the Supreme Court has undermined the basis for de
fining pervasively sectarian institutions as those institutions where diversion is likely or
where government aid would create a symbolic union between church and state. See
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223-30. Therefore, a pervasively sectarian institution may now be de
fined as an institution for which there is actual evidence that secular government aid would,
in fact, subsidize religious indoctrination.
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ment Clause j urisprudence. Neutrality is at the heart of the effect
prong of the Lemon/Agostini test150 and, as this Part shows, is relevant
in several respects. Section II.A focuses on the neutral availability of
conduit financing, highlighting the importance of this evenhandedness
in the ultimate determination of constitutionality. Section 11.B consid
ers the role of private choice in revenue bond issuances, arguing that
the intervening choice of private bond purchasers, although limited in
scope, is further indication that these transactions are in accord with
the Court's current Establishment Clause j urisprudence. Finally, Sec
tion 11.C contends that revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively
sectarian institutions do not create an incentive for individuals to un
dergo religious indoctrination and, thus, that these transactions satisfy
the definition-of-recipients prong of the Agostini test.
A.

Revenue Bonds as Neutrally A vailable Government Aid

This Section argues that revenue bond issuances possess the neu
trality that the Supreme Court has emphasized in its recent Establish
ment Clause j urisprudence, an important factor in the ultimate deter
mination that these issuances do not violate the Establishment
Clause's limitation on church-state interaction. The manner in which
the government distributes aid - and, in particular, the degree to
which such distribution is neutral toward religion - is important be
cause of its relevance to the more fundamental issue of whether the
government has a role in any religious indoctrination that may occur
at the recipient institution. 151 When the Court determines that the
government has distributed aid without considering recipients' relig
ious affiliation, this finding supports the conclusion that religious in-

150. The focus of this Part is the "effect" prong of the Agostini test. Supreme Court ju
risprudence has shown that the "purpose" prong is so easily satisfied that it is of little conse
quence in the Establishment Clause analysis. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (plurality opinion)
(explaining that the Supreme Court did not consider the "purpose" of the program in ques
tion because plaintiffs did not challenge the District Court's holding that the program had a
secular purpose); Witters, 474 U.S. at 485 ("Our analysis relating to the first prong of that
test is simple: all parties concede the unmistakably secular purpose of the Washington pro
gram."); see also Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe,
Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771,
795 (2001) (noting that the purpose prong of the Lemon test often had "no effect").
In the case of conduit financing, the act under scrutiny would be that which created the
Authority. Such acts typically have a clear secular purpose, such as the promotion and im
provement of higher-education facilities within the state. See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Facilities Auth.
v. Priest, 526 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1974) (describing the purpose of the California Educational
Facilities Authority Act as "providing private institutions of higher education within the
state an additional means by which to expand, enlarge, and establish dormitory, academic,
and related facilities, to finance such facilities, and to refinance existing facilities" (quoting
Cal. Educ. Code § 30301 (currently codified as amended at Cal. Educ. Code § 94100 (West
Supp. 2002))); Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 687 (describing Va. Code Ann. § 23-30.39).
151. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (plurality opinion) (discussing the "governmental indoc
trination" prong of the Agostini test).
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doctrination at the recipient institution does not result from govern
ment action.152 "Neutrality" in this context refers to a specific form of
neutrality: an "evenhandedness of distribution. "153 The Court's inquiry
does not concern the degree to which the government aid is generally
neutral toward religion but instead focuses on whether the govern
ment allocates aid in a manner that is itself neutral toward religion.154
By making aid available to applicants with a variety of views, religious
or otherwise, the government avoids advancing any particular view.155
Neutrality in this limited sense is a single factor for the Court to weigh
along with the aid's other qualities. 1 56
In its application of this neutrality standard, the Court has ap
proved of government programs that offer aid to any applicant, of any
religion, who meets purely secular criteria. In Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind,1 51 for example, the Court vali
dated a state vocational assistance program that assisted individuals
with visual handicaps in obtaining an education. 158 The basic standard
of eligibility for the state aid was a visual impairment; the selection of
aid recipients, therefore, had nothing to do with religion. Similarly, in

152. Id. at 809-10 (plurality opinion).
153. Id. at 883 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (approving of a
program "that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'disabled' under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends").
154. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 883 (Souter, J., dissenting) The form of neutrality advocated
by Justice Thomas in Mitchell is equality among secular and sectarian parties - a refusal to
inquire into religious affiliation when distributing government aid. See id. at 809 ("[W]e have
consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad
range of groups or persons without regard to their religion."). Moreover, Justice Thomas
stressed in Mitchell that neutrality and private choice are typically necessary to ensure that
no religious indoctrination may be attributed to the government. See, e.g. , id. at 811 (plural
ity opinion) (contending that "private choices helped to ensure neutrality, and neutrality and
private choices together eliminated any possible attribution to the government" in Zobrest).
Thus, Professor Chemerinsky's fear that, under Justice Thomas's Mitchell standard, "a
school could begin each day with a prayer so long as every religion got its due," is un
founded. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Why the Rehnquist Court ls Wrong About the Establish
ment Clause, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 221, 227 (2001). By requiring a period of religious reflec
tion, this practice is not neutral toward secular or areligious interests, as Mitchell requires.
155. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10 (plurality opinion) ("If the government is offering assis
tance to recipients who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the govern
ment itself is not thought responsible for any particular indoctrination.").
156. Id. at 2581 (Souter, J., dissenting). As this Section stresses, facial neutrality is only
one consideration in the Court's multi-layered analysis. A facially neutral program may still
run afoul of the Establishment Clause by directly aiding an institution's religious functions
(e.g., if a state or municipality made direct grants available to all universities - including
pervasively sectarian universities such as Regent University and Lipscomb University) or by
creating an excessive entanglement between church and state (e.g., if a loan agreement be
tween a conduit issuer and a pervasively sectarian university gave the state the power to veto
any award of tenure at the recipient university).
157. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
158. Id. at 482-83.
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Agostini v. Felton, the Court found neutrality in a program that sent
public school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial edu
cation.159 The Court noted that Title I, which created the program,
made aid available to any child who lived in a low-income area and
was unlikely to meet the state's educational performance standards. 1 60
Again, religious affiliation was not a factor in the allocation of gov
ernment aid.
Revenue bond issuances such as those in Lynn and Steele possess ·
the facial neutrality required by cases such as Witters and Agostini be
cause the statutes authorizing revenue bond issuances allow for the in
clusion of any private institution that can advance the conduit issuer's
primary mission. In Lynn, for instance, the Educational Facilities
Authority Act provided a loose standard of eligibility that did not sin
gle out religious colleges and universities as being especially qualified
for this form of government aid;161 quite the contrary, in fact, as the
statute disfavored religious education.162 Similarly, the statute creating
the issuing authority in Steele was so decidedly neutral that the plain
tiffs did not bother to challenge its facial neutrality.163
The possibility remains that, despite the facial neutrality of the
statutes authorizing revenue bond issuances, a particular conduit is
suer could distribute aid with a bias toward religious universities. This

159. Agostini, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997).
160. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6315(b)(l)(B) (1994)).
161. The Educational Facilities Authority Act empowers the Authority to issue bonds
for "any of its corporate purposes," which include aiding "institutions for higher education."
Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 687 (quoting Va. Code. Ann. §§ 23-30.39,
-.42(b) (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). An "institution for higher education" is
"[a] nonprofit educational institution within the Commonwealth (of Virginia] whose primary
purpose is to provide collegiate or graduate education and not to provide religious training
or theological education." Id. (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 23-30.41 (e) (2000) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
162. See id. (excluding from eligibility "any facility used or to be used for sectarian in
struction or as a place of religious worship [or] any facility which is used or to be used pri
marily in connection with any part of the program or a school or department of divinity for
any religious denomination" (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 23-30.41 (b) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
163. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 723-24 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). As evidence of the statute's facial neutrality, the Court quoted the act's declaration of purpose:
It is the intent of the legislature by the passage of this chapter to authorize the incorporation
in the several municipalities in this state of public corporations to finance, acquire, own,
lease, and/or dispose of properties to the end that such corporations may be able to maintain
and increase employment opportunities, increase the production of agricultural commodi
ties, and increase the quantity of housing available in affected municipalities by promoting
industry, trade, commerce, tourism, and recreation, agricultural and housing construction by
inducing by inducing [sic] manufacturing, industrial, governmental, educational, financial,
service, commercial, recreational and agricultural enterprises to locate in or remain in this
state and further the use and production of its agricultural products and natural resources,
and to vest such corporations with all powers that may be necessary to enable them to ac
complish such purposes.
Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-53-102(a) (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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danger, inherent in any form of government aid, presents a different
question from the constitutionality of such aid in principle. The
Court's refusal to consider potential diversion of secular government
aid to religious purposes suggests that the Court would likewise de
cline to consider administrative bias absent a specific allegation to that
effect.164 Any such bias would, of course, advance religion in violation
of the Establishment Clause. The more pressing question is whether
government aid violates the Establishment Clause when the govern
ment allocates aid evenhandedly to both secular and religious institu
tions. The facial neutrality of statutes authorizing such aid is one fac
tor indicating that the government program does not contravene the
Establishment Clause.
The neutrality of statutes authorizing conduit issuances is no su
perficial matter. It is evidence of the very rationale behind the legisla
tive creation of such programs. This point is most obvious when one
examines the revenue bond issuance from the perspective of the is
suer.165 In most cases, the state creates the conduit issuer to further a
particular secular purpose.166 The conduit issuer then offers to finance
appropriate projects at any institution willing to aid the government in
achieving its goal. When financing through the conduit issuer is avail
able to all institutions, secular or religious, each resulting loan ar
rangement between the issuer and the benefiting institution will have
the effect of promoting the government's secular purpose. The aid is
neutral in the sense that it uses all qualifying private volunteers to fur
ther an overriding - and secular - government objective.
When the recipient institution is pervasively sectarian, however,
the question arises whether aid is still neutral when it has the concomi
tant effect of advancing the recipient's religious agenda. This is the
main charge of those who oppose revenue bond issuances that benefit
religious institutions: that a facially neutral statute is decidedly not
neutral when its aid lends direct support to religious activities.167 The
immediate flaw with this argument is that it conflates one kind of neu
trality with another. As noted above, the issue under the government
indoctrination prong of the Lemon/Agostini test is not whether the
government aid is neutral toward religion in general but whether it is

164. See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 761 (1976) (plurality opinion)
("It has not been the Court's practice, in considering facial challenges to statutes of this kind,
to strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitu
tional use of funds.").
165. Justice Thomas suggests and applies this perspective in Mitchell. See Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000) (plurality opinion).
166. With the bond issue under consideration here, that purpose is likely to be the pro
motion of higher education within the state.
167. See, e.g., Steele, 1 17 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
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neutral toward applicants.168 The statute's overall neutrality toward
religion is the issue of ultimate constitutional concern and, as such,
cannot be settled with a single prong of the multi-prong
Lemon/Agostini test. The Court uses this more narrow form of neu
trality in determining whether it may reasonably attribute religious in
doctrination to the government.
Besides this confusion about the meaning of neutrality, this argu
ment fails to account for the fact that the Court has permitted aid that
does, in fact, advance religion in some way. For example, while the
Court has prohibited the government from directly advancing the re
ligious mission of sectarian institutions, 169 it has not extended this pro
hibition to indirect aid.170 Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the
idea that such a broad proscription is even possible.171 After all,
Everson v. Board of Education held in 1947 that the First Amendment
did not prohibit a board of education from reimbursing parents of
children attending private schools for bus transportation costs.172 The
Court reasoned that the state must at least permit religious institutions
to benefit from public services such as police and fire protection that
are available to all.173 While "cutting off church schools from these
services" would guarantee that the state had absolutely no role in the
persistence of religious activities,174 the Court concluded that the only
168. For a thorough overview of the different uses of the concept of "neutrality" in the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see Justice Souter's dissent in
Mitchell. 530 U.S. at 878-84. He identifies three distinct uses of the term "neutral," corre
sponding roughly to three phases in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As
originally used in Everson, "neutrality" was "a term for government in its required median
position between aiding and handicapping religion." Id. at 879. Next, the Court used "neu
trality" to identify aid that was secular, or nonreligious, in content. Id. at 880. In this sense,
neutrality connotes not the optimal government position vis-a-vis religion but the nature of
permissible government aid. Finally, neutrality came to mean to "evenhanded," or a distri
bution of aid without regard to recipients' religious affiliation. Id. at 881 Justice Souter ar
gues that the Mitchell plurality equates the third kind of neutrality with the first, improperly
treating evenhandedness as a "stand-alone criterion." See id. at 883-84.
169. See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)
("It is . . . well settled . . . that the State may not grant aid to a religious school, whether cash
or in kind, where the effect of the aid is 'that of a direct subsidy to the religious school' from
the State." (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1993)); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971) (overturning a Pennsylvania program that partially
reimbursed parochial schools for the costs of providing instruction in secular subjects and a
Rhode Island program supplying direct financial support to teachers of secular subjects in
private schools).
170. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 486-87.
171. See, e.g. , Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) ("We have
never said that 'religious institutions are disabled by the First Amendment from participat
ing in publicly sponsored social welfare programs.' "(quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 609 (1988)).
172. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see also Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, The Establish
ment of Religion, 5 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 21.4 (3d ed. 1999).
173. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
174. Id. at 18.
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neutral position for the state toward religion is to provide those public
services that allow religious institutions to function on a minimal
level.175 Anything less, the Court reasoned, would amount to hostility
toward religion1 76 - an impermissible result under the First Amend
ment. As indicated by Everson, the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause standard requires courts to ask not only whether government
aid advances religion but how religion is advanced - and, more im
portantly, what role the government plays in that advancement.
Admittedly, the Court placed greater emphasis on the character of
the recipients of government aid in its Tilton-era Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, holding in Lemon, for example, that the government
must limit aid to the beneficiary's "secular, neutral, or nonideological"
functions.177 The rule that the government must aid the secular without
advancing the religious functions explains the Court's prior concern
with pervasive sectarianism, as the Court reasoned that the govern
ment could not aid pervasively sectarian institutions without directly
supporting their religious agenda.178 In recent opinions, however, the
Court has focused less on the religious character of aid recipients and
more on the neutral and indirect nature of government aid.179 In Wit
ters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,180 the Court
approved aid that allowed an individual with a visual impairment to
"study[] the Bible, ethics, speech, and church administration in order
to equip himself for a career as a pastor, missionary, or youth direc
tor. "1 81 The aid in Witters not only facilitated one individual's religious
instruction but, in financing the aid recipient's seminary training, con
tributed to the perpetuation of his religion.182 Nevertheless, the Court
found that because the aid recipient chose to use "neutrally available
state aid" to pay for his education at Inland Empire School of the Bi
ble, it could not attribute the recipient's religious training to the gov
ernment.183
Witters highlighted the fact that neutral availability is a single fac
tor in the overall determination of whether the government has played

175. Id.; see also Nowck & Rotunda supra note 172, § 21.4 (describing the Everson ra
tionale).
176. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 ("State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.").
177. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971).
178. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
179. See Lark & Groves, supra note 21, at 188.
180. 474 U.S. 481 (1985).
181. Id. at 483.
182. The petitioner in Witters was training "to become a pastor, missionary, or youth
director," id. at 489, indicating that his intention was to disseminate or at least perpetuate his
religious beliefs.
183. Id. at 489.
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a role in religious indoctrination. Thus, when the government distrib
utes aid without regard to the religious affiliation of potential benefi
ciaries, this neutrality is one factor suggesting that the aid program is
constitutional. Statutes empowering conduit issuers to issue revenue
bonds on behalf of private entities possess this neutrality because they
do not discriminate between potential recipients based on religious af
filiation. This determination of facial neutrality is an initial step to
ward the ultimate goal of deciding whether pervasively sectarian insti
tutions' participation in conduit financing arrangements is neutral in
the sense mandated by the Establishment Clause.
B.

Bond Purchasers and Private Choice

This Section contends that, although revenue bond issuances limit
bond purchasers to choosing only whether to buy bonds for a prede
termined beneficiary, this narrow choice nevertheless supplies the
element of private choice that the Supreme Court has required in its
recent Establishment Clause j urisprudence. The Court's private choice
analysis focuses on the method through which the government allo
cates aid to a particular institution. The Court has approved govern
ment aid that is both neutral and distributed to religious institutions
through the decisions of individual citizens, 184 thereby drawing a sharp
distinction between aid programs that provide public funds directly to
religious institutions185 and those programs that distribute aid to indi
viduals who then - independently and privately - may decide to use
that aid toward religious education.186 This rule is based on the ration
ale that, when a government program allocates aid to an individual
who is then free to use this aid in the setting of his or her choice, any
religious indoctrination to which the individual is subject is not attrib
utable to the government.187 These programs are an easy case, for both

184. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986);
Indeed, the plurality in Mitchell not only recognized the connection between neutrality and
private choice but emphasized the importance of both neutrality and private choice to the
ultimate determination of constitutionality. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 812 (2000)
(noting the importance of neutrality, private choice, and "the relationship between the
two."); id. (finding that "neutrality and private choices together eliminated any possible at
tribution to the government." (emphasis added)).
185. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(grants to nonpublic schools).
186. See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (grants to disabled students); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at § 12.2.6.2 (describing the distinction between aid provided
directly to an institution and aid distributed to students).
187. See, e.g. , Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 811 (plurality opinion) (describing the logic of the
neutrality/private choice standard); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (approving federal provision of a
sign-language interpreter to a student at a Catholic high school); Witters, 474 U.S. at 483
(approving aid for a visually impaired student at a private, Christian college).

March 2002]

Revenue Bonds and Religious Education

1 137

the neutrality of the government aid and the individual's role in de
termining the ultimate destination of the government aid are clear.188
Programs in which the private choice played a subtler role have
also passed constitutional muster. In Agostini v. Felton, 1 89 the Supreme
Court considered Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965, which provided federal funds to "local educational agen
cies. "190 These local agencie's were to use this aid to finance remedial
education and counseling programs.191 In its use of Title I funds, the
Board of Education of the City of New York, a local educational
agency, sent public teachers to religious schools to provide instruction
in secular subjects. 192 The Court found the role of private choice in this
program "indistinguishable" from its role in the Zobrest and Witters
programs: "Both programs make aid available only to eligible recipi
ents. That aid is provided to students at whatever school they choose
to attend."193 Agostini makes clear, then, that Witters and Zobrest do
not stand for the proposition that private choice is present only when
the government provides a benefit to an individual who then allocates
that aid to the school of his choice. Rather, the private choice analysis
requires courts to determine whether government aid runs to religious
institutions as the result of individual choices - even if the institution
then applies that aid collectively.194 As the plurality stated in Mitchell,
private choice is most apparent when government aid is given directly
to individuals who then allocate that aid to religious institutions, but
"there is no reason why the Establishment Clause requires such a
form."195
Lynn and Steele evince a sharp difference of opinion over whether
government loans funded by revenue bonds involve an element of pri
vate choice. In Lynn, the Virginia Supreme Court found private
choice in the fact that all funds flowing to the recipient college were
raised through the conduit issuance of revenue bonds, and, thus, con
sisted entirely of the private assets of bond purchasers. The court rea
soned that " [i]f no private investors purchase bonds issued on behalf

188. See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993); Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (1985); see also
Monsma, supra note 83, at 323 (identifying the neutrality/public choice combination as one
of "two lines of legal reasoning" that the Court has utilized in approving government aid to
sectarian institutions).
189. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
190. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209-10.
191. Id. at 209 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6315(c)(l)(A)).
192. Id. at 210.
193. Id. at 228.
194. See id. (noting that the distinction between a benefit flowing to one individual and
a benefit flowing to multiple individuals is constitutionally insignificant).
195. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 816 (2000).
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of Regent, no funds flow to Regent."196 According to the Virginia
Supreme Court's logic in Lynn, it is the intervening private choice of
investors, rather than that of the government authority, that allocates
government aid to the recipient institution.197 The court found that,
because this decision concerns a potential investment, bond purchas
ers are more likely to consider "market factors and personal circum
stances" than religious considerations.198 In contrast, Steele rejected al
together the contention that bond purchasers contribute a private
choice element to the constitutional analysis. For the district court, it is
the Board (the conduit issuer) rather than the private investor who de
termines which institutions may benefit from government-issued reve
nue bonds.199 Unlike the petitioners in Zobrest and Witters, bond pur
chasers "could not select which institution they wanted to receive the
funds."200 In other words, a purchaser seeking to benefit from the tax
free interest of revenue bonds is stuck with the recipient institutions
selected by the conduit issuer. According to Steele's analysis, then,
revenue bond transactions involve an intervening third party but fail
to leave that party any meaningful choice in the allocation of aid.
Notwithstanding the district court's conclusion in Steele that the
private choice of bond purchasers has limited significance for the con
stitutional inquiry, this choice nevertheless fulfills an important role in
the distribution of government aid. Indeed, the Virginia Supreme
Court found in Lynn that, although the bond purchaser's private
choice consists simply of deciding whether or not to purchase bonds
issued on behalf of a particular institution, this restricted choice was
enough for Establishment Clause purposes.201 A binary, "yes-or-no"
choice differs in an obvious sense from the private choice of Zobrest
and Witters, in which the government predetermines only the form of
aid and allows individuals to distribute it to whom they choose. Never
theless, the Lynn court found that this limited form of private choice is
in accord with the logic of the private choice analysis,202 a conclusion
that holds up when one considers the primary role of private choice in
the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Private

196. Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 698 (Va. 2000).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 699; see also DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, THE PRIVATE USE OF TAX-EXEMPT
BONDS 74-75 (Urban Institute Press, 1991) ("Tax-exempt bonds are purchased primarily by
households, commercial banks, property and casualty insurance companies, and open-end
bond funds. All of these investors are motivated primarily by the tax-exempt interest. These
investors tend to move in and out of the municiR�l bond market as their need for sheltering
income from taxation rises and falls and the tax treatment of the interest income changes.").
199. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, at 724-25 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
200. Id. at 725.
201. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 698-99.
202. Id.
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choice, according to the Mitchell plurality, prevents the government
from "grant[ing] special favors that might lead to a religious estab
lishment,"203 and counters any tendency for government programs to
favor "pre-existing recipients."204 More fundamentally, private choice
ensures that religious indoctrination is an individual rather than gov
ernmental choice.205
Given this understanding of the function of private choice, Lynn's
binary choice fails in one respect. A yes-or-no choice clearly cannot
allocate government aid (entitlement to benefit from a revenue bond
issue) to those colleges and universities whose proposals have been
rejected by the conduit issuer. Aside from the usual market forces,
then, bond purchasers' choices do not have the effect of redistributing
aid. They can, however, achieve other important goals. These inter
vening choices operate as a public check on the government, allowing
investors to veto any attempt by the government to grant "special fa
vors" to particular religious organizations.206 Moreover, the bond pur
chasers' role undermines the appearance of government endorse
ment,207 and, as the Virginia Supreme Court noted in Lynn, guarantees
that no money is loaned to religious institutions unless private inves
tors have consented - and have supplied the necessary funds.208
Ultimately, investors' private choices are only relevant to the con
stitutional analysis insofar as they distance the government from any
religious indoctrination that may take place at a recipient institution,209
and, in this regard, the Court has looked to private choice and neutral
availability together.210 In the case of revenue bond issuances, acts
authorizing government authorities to release revenue bonds possess
the facial neutrality called for by the Supreme Court's modern Estab
lishment Clause jurisprudence.211 The private choice of the bond pur
chasers, although more narrow in scope than the private choice in
Zobrest and Witters, is a check against government bias, ensuring that
the government's role in allocating aid is not exclusive. Revenue bond
issuances therefore include an important, though limited, element of
private choice.

203. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion).
204. Id. (plurality opinion).
205. Id. at 811(plurality opinion) (stating that private choice in Zobrest ensured that any
government worker found in a sectarian institution was there "only as a result of the private
decision of individual parents" (internal citation omitted)).
206. Id. at 810 (plurality opinion).
207. See id. at 810.
208. See supra note 196.
209. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810-11 (plurality opinion).
210. Id. (plurality opinion).
211. See, e.g., Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 583 S.E.2d 682, 687 (Va. 2000) (citing Va.
Code §§ 23-30-39, -42).
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Neutral Distribution of Aid and Incentive

This Section argues that, because any institution may benefit from
a revenue bond issuance, this form of government aid does not create
an incentive for students to undergo religious indoctrination. The
Supreme Court examines the method by which an aid program defines
its recipients in determining whether it violates the Establishment
Clause.212 At first blush, this prong seems to ask the same question as
the initial neutrality test. Indeed, the definition of recipients prong
"looks to the same set of facts" as the neutrality test.213 This incentive
inquiry, however, "uses those facts to answer a somewhat different
question: whether the criteria for allowing the aid 'create[ s] a financial
incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.' "214 The Court has ar
ticulated an almost bright-line rule in this area: no incentive is present
when the government allocates aid without concern for the religious
affiliation of potential aid recipients.215
In applying thi's rule, the Court has upheld aid programs that assist
all eligible students at any school, religious or secular.216 In Agostini,
for example, the Court concluded that the Board of Education's Title
I services did not create an incentive for students to undertake relig
ious indoctrination because Title I services were available to all chil
dren "no matter what their religious beliefs or where they go to
school."217 Similarly, the Court found no incentive in Witters because
the government program did not provide any particular benefits to in
dividuals who chose to attend a sectarian institution.218
The application of this rule to revenue bond issuances differs in
some respects from its use in Zobrest,219 Witters,220 and Agostini.221 In

212. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997).
213. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (plurality opinion); see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230-31
(noting that the criteria used to determine whether the recipient's use of government aid to
indoctrinate could be attributed to the state are also pertinent to the issue of whether the
program creates a "financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination").
214. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (plurality opinion) (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231 (al
teration in original)).
215. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (plurality opinion) (de
scribing Agostini's incentive analysis as a "rule").
216. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 ,
10 (1993); Mueller v . Allen, 436 U.S. 388, 398-399 (1983); Bd. o f Ed. o f Central Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 1 6-18
(1947)).
217. Id. at 232 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6312(c)(l)(F)).
218. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986). Instead, the
program allowed participants to choose from "a huge variety of possible careers, of which
only a small handful are sectarian." Id. ; see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (finding no incentive
where students could use a government-paid interpreter at the school of their choice).
219. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
220. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
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Zobrest and Witters, the central issue was whether the government aid
to the individual student created an incentive for the student to choose
religious indoctrination at a sectarian school.222 Revenue bond issu
ances benefiting religious universities require courts to consider in
stead whether the government aid (a loan financed with revenue
bonds) to the school creates an incentive for the student to choose the
recipient school. The incentive analysis, therefore, asks the following
in this case: Since revenue bond issuances allow benefiting universities
to improve facilities, does this aid attract students to the university,
thereby contributing to the indoctrination of students who would oth
erwise have attended another university?
Lynn, applying the Agostini rule, found that the program did not
create an incentive because it was open to "all qualifying institutions
of higher education without regard to religious affiliation."223 The
court reasoned that, because any university could take advantage of
this special form of financing, there was no reason to believe that per
vasively sectarian institutions were more likely to participate and
therefore more likely to gain a competitive advantage (with cheaper
loans) over nonsectarian institutions.224 This conclusion is in line with
the Supreme Court's current standard. The Agostini rule looks only at
whether the aid is neutrally available.225 That the aid may then benefit
the recipient institution - and consequently make the university more
attractive to potential students - is irrelevant to the Court's analysis.
Because any university can finance construction and improvements in
the same way, pervasively sectarian institutions have no particular
competitive advantage. In short, the Agostini rule looks only at neu
trality and statutes authorizing these conduit issuances neither favor
nor disfavor religion.
III. THE LIMITED CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIP IN CONDUIT
FINANCING

This Part contends that the ultimate relationship between a state
or municipality and a religious university benefiting from a revenue
bond-funded loan is so attenuated that, in light of the neutrality estab
lished in Part II, such aid does not raise any legitimate Establishment
Clause concerns. Section III.A argues that, because a loan funded by a
revenue bond issuance does not include any public funds, the only
government aid to the recipient institution is that the university - due

221. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232.
222. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
223. Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 698 (Va. 2000).
224. See id.
225. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231.
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to the tax exemption accorded to revenue bond purchasers - may fi
nance an improvement at a lower cost than if that entity had obtained
a private loan. This benefit, as well as the government's involvement
in allocating and monitoring the benefit, is too indirect to constitute
excessive entanglement. Section 111.B examines the church-state rela
tionship in conduit bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian
transactions through the lens of the endorsement test, demonstrating
that an authority's decision to issue revenue bonds on behalf of a per
vasively sectarian university is not an act of government endorse
ment.226
A.

Excessive Entanglement: Government Loans Without Public
Funds

This Section demonstrates that the church-state relationship in
conduit-financing arrangements involving pervasively sectarian uni
versities is too attenuated to violate the excessive entanglement prong
of the Agostini test. Generally, the excessive entanglement test calls
for the Court to examine "the character and purposes of the institu
tions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides,
and the resulting relationship between the government and religious
authority."227 The Court's excessive entanglement inquiry concerns
two distinct forms of entanglement: administrative and political entan
glement.228 Administrative entanglement may be present where "[a]
comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" is
required to ensure that secular aid remains secular in effect.229 Political
entanglement, on the other hand, is possible where government aid to
religious institutions is likely to bring about "political division along
religious lines. "230
As the Court acknowledged in Agostini, this entanglement inquiry
has relaxed to some degree in recent Establishment Clause cases.231
"Administrative cooperation" and political divisiveness are now "in
sufficient by themselves to create an 'excessive entanglement.' "232
Thus, even the need for the government to monitor the distribution
and subsequent use of government aid in order to make certain that

226. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592
(1989) (describing the "endorsement" test).
227. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
228. STONE ET AL., supra note 68, at 1588.
229. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
230. Id. at 622.
231. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233-34.
232. Id. at 234.
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no diversion occurs does not necessarily lead to excessive entangle
ment under the Court's current Establishment Clause standard.
Moreover, in rejecting the presumption that recipients will divert pub
lic aid to further religious indoctrination, the Court has "discard[ed]
the assumption that pervasive monitoring [of aid recipients] is re
quired."233 Because the Supreme Court has not found an excessive
church-state entanglement in any post-Agostini cases, it is unclear
what factors are necessary to establish an excessive church-state en
tanglement. The Agostini dictum,234 however, leaves open the possi
bility that the presence of administrative cooperation, political divi
siveness, as well as some form of monitoring or oversight, would
violate this prong of the Lemon/Agostini test if the Court deemed this
combination of factors to be excessive.
The first element of the excessive entanglement test, the nature of
the institution, is a given for purposes of this Note: the universities at
issue are so sectarian in nature that it is impossible for the government
to aid only their secular functions, despite the fact that any govern
ment aid would be purely secular in content.235 Having determined the
nature of the institutions likely to benefit from this government aid, it
is possible to turn to the second element of the excessive entanglement
inquiry: the nature of government aid involved in revenue bond issu
ances. Justice Powell, writing for a majority in Hunt v. McNair, pro
vided an apt description of the type of aid at issue:
The "state aid" involved in this case is of a very special sort. We have
here no expenditure of public funds, either by grant or loan, no reim
bursement by a State for expenditures made by a parochial school or

the
only state aid consists, not of financial assistance directly or indirectly
which would implicate public funds or credit, but the creation of an in
strumentality (the Authority) through which educational institutions may
borrow funds on the basis of their own credit and the security of their own
property upon more favorable interest terms than otherwise would be
available. The Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized the assistance
college, and no extending or committing of a State's credit. Rather,

rendered an educational institution under an act generally similar to the
South Carolina Act as merely being a "governmental service." The South
Carolina Supreme Court, in the opinion below, described the role of the
State as that of a "mere conduit."236

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp 2d 693, 734 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (finding
that Lipscomb University is pervasively sectarian); Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d
682, 698 (Va. 2000) (finding that Regent University is pervasively sectarian according to the
standard articulated in Tilton); As Part I argues, the Court's Tilton-era standard would have
presumptively disqualified such an institution from government aid.
236. 413 U.S. 734, 745 n.7 (1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Justice Powell's characterization of the state aid provided by a conduit
issuer makes an important distinction for the present analysis: the aid
at issue does not involve any public funds. That is, a loan funded di
rectly237 or indirectly238 by revenue bonds does not include any tax
payer dollars. It is not the loan to the pervasively sectarian institution,
therefore, that raises constitutional concerns. Rather, according to
Justice Powell, the only state aid is the creation of the conduit issuer
itself and the possibility that a particular institution may borrow at a
more favorable rate than that available through private financing.
When constitutional inquiry focuses on this difference between
funding with revenue bonds and private financing, two key factors
come into focus. First, any benefit received by a religious university
stems from the independent benefit received by both private bond
purchasers and the issuing authority. Indeed, it is only by making a
cheaper loan available to private entities such as religiously oriented
universities that an issuing authority is able to promote its legislative
agenda at all.239 This fact does not support the argument that only
bondholders, rather than the pervasively sectarian university, benefit
from the conduit issuance.240 A loan funded by revenue bonds, because
it is a relatively inexpensive form of financing, provides a clear finan
cial benefit to the university on whose behalf the bonds were issued. It
does, however, mean that a recipient university is not the only benefi
ciary and may not even be the primary beneficiary.
Second, any benefit received by a religious university is due to the
tax exemption granted to private bond purchasers.241 The benefit is not

237. E.g. , Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 241 F.3d 501, 505 (2001) (describing a revenue
bond issuance in which proceeds from a completed bond sale were loaned to the recipient
entity).
238. See, e.g., Steele, 1 17 F. Supp. 2d at 717 ("In reality, the government Authority issu
ing the bonds does not involve itself in all the financial details of the transaction. Instead, the
Authority arranges to borrow the bond proceed amount from a bank at the time of the bond
issuance. The Authority names the bank as the trustee of the bond issue, and the bank dis
perses the money 'borrowed' by the Authority to the Entity. In return, the Authority assigns
its interest in the loan to the Entity to the bank, so that the Entity is repaying the bank di
rectly.").
239. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 739 (noting the role of the income tax exemption to the issu
ing authority).
240. The defendants in Steele had advanced this claim. See Steele, 117 F. Supp 2d at 71718. In response, the court found that "[a]Ithough the bond holders did benefit financially
from the tax-exempt nature of the municipal bonds, that is not the only benefit that accrued
in this case . . . . Lipscomb has repeatedly stated that it received a substantial benefit from
the tax-exempt bonds . . . and that it could not have completed the project if it had not been
granted the benefit . . . . " Id. ; see also Jeffrey Selingo, Judge Rejects Tax-Free Bonds for Religious University, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. Nov. 10, 2000, at A3 (noting that Lipscomb
University's lawyer, Bradley MaClean, argued that the district court "improperly applied
[the 'pervasively sectarian' test] because bondholders, not the university itself, directly re
ceived the tax benefits").
241. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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a direct grant or subsidy but is instead derived from an exemption
from a government-imposed burden. Admittedly, the difference be
tween a loan funded by revenue bonds and a loan obtained on the pri
vate market may be significant. According to one estimate, for exam
ple, the revenue bond issue approved in Lynn saved Regent "about
$30 million in interest over the 30-year life of the loan. "242 Because this
gain results from the government's consent to excuse private bond
purchasers from a governmentally imposed loss, however, it cannot be
equivalent to a direct grant or subsidy. Walz v. Tax Commission man
dates this conclusion.243 In holding that the New York City Tax Com
mission did not violate the First Amendment by granting property tax
exemptions to religious organizations, Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the Court, found a fundamental difference between exemptions
from taxation and direct subsidies: "The grant of a tax exemption is
not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its
revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the
church support the state . . . . There is no genuine nexus between tax
exemption and the establishment of religion."244 The gain realized by
religious universities in revenue bond issuances is an even more indi
rect economic benefit245 than that contemplated in Walz, as revenue
bonds exempt the interest realized by the bond purchaser - and not
the profit realized by the recipient university - from taxation.
Despite the clarity of Hunt and Walz, opponents of transactions
such as those at issue in Lynn and Steele have attempted in various
ways to characterize the government assistance in these cases as a
form of direct aid. In Steele, the District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee supported its finding that loans funded by revenue bonds
are a form of direct aid by arguing that the Supreme Court itself had
recognized such aid as direct.246 The court contended that, in
Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia,241 the Supreme
Court cited Hunt "as one of the cases correctly cited by the Court of
Appeals establishing 'the principle that we have recognized special Es
tablishment Clause dangers where the government makes direct
money payments to sectarian institutions. ' "248 Given that the Court

242. Regent Press Release, supra note 22, at 1 .
243. 397 U.S. 664 (1970); see also Lark, supra note 29, a t 177 (predicting that the
Mitchell plurality, if faced with the constitutional issue presented in cases such as Steele and
Lynn, "would conclude that the program is an indirect tax exemption governed by Walz").
244. Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
245. Id. at 674-75.
246. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 719-20 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
247. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
248. Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 720 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)). The passage from Rosenberger reads: "The Court
of Appeals (and the dissent) are correct to extract from our decisions the principle
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expressly noted in Hunt that aid funded by a revenue bond issuance is
not financial aid at all - direct or indirect249 - it is likely that the
Court was stating in Rosenberger that Hunt, like Roemer and Tilton,
recognizes the general principle that direct aid to sectarian institutions
entails special Establishment Clause dangers.
Those opposed to bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian
institutions have also attempted to raise a constitutional issue by dis
regarding the significance of the revenue bond issuance itself. In
Steele, for instance, the court found that the money received by
Lipscomb through the bond issuance was, in essence, nothing more
than a loan: "Lipscomb went to the Board in order to get a low
interest government loan, and that is exactly what it received. "250 The
bond issuance, in the court's analysis, was "simply the financing tool
through which the government was able to collect funds sufficient to
meet the $15,000,000 agreed to in the loan. "251 Even assuming that the
government aid consisted of the entire loan rather than only the dif
ference between revenue bond-funded financing and private financing
as suggested above, there is a flaw in the district court's characteriza
tion. Because the substance of the loan, the money itself, came from
private investors rather from than the government, the loan is not
from the government. As the Supreme Court noted in Hunt, the gov
ernment is a conduit in the loan transaction,252 channeling money from
bond purchasers to the recipient entity. Although an entity such as
Lipscomb may approach a government authority seeking a relatively
low-cost loan, the authority was initially set up by the state legislature
in order to promote and facilitate such transactions. A pervasively sec
tarian university seeking a cost-effective method of financing an im
provement can only approach a conduit issuer because the state legis
lature initially made such an authority available for parties considering
projects meeting the legislature's secular agenda. In this light, it is un
reasonable to view the transaction solely as one that benefits the re
cipient university; the authority - and thus the state - receives a de
liberately sought-after benefit as well.

that we have recognized special Establishment Clause dangers where the government
makes direct money payments to sectarian institutions . . . . " Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 842.
(citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742 (1973)).
249. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 745 n.7 ("Rather, the only state aid consists, not of financial
assistance directly or indirectly which would implicate public funds or credit, but the creation
of an instrumentality . . . . ").
250. Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
251. Id.; see also id. at 720 (finding that the loan was a direct benefit to Lipscomb Uni
versity because the government "chose to provide Lipscomb with low-interest financing
through a loan agreement").
252. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 745 n.7 (noting with apparent approval that a lower court
viewed the state's role in a revenue bond issuance "as that of a 'mere conduit' " (quoting
Hunt v. McNair, 187 S.E.2d 645, 650 (S.C. 1972)).
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Critics have also argued that the actual benefit received by a re
cipient university as defined in the Hunt footnote - the difference be
tween the revenue bond-financed loan and a private loan - is itself a
form of direct aid because the state is deprived of the tax revenue it
would have acquired had the university been forced to seek out pri
vate sources of financial assistance.253 That is, due to the tax-free inter
est on revenue bonds, the state loses revenue that would have been
paid on the interest of a private loan.254 This position has little merit in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Commission.255
The Court ruled in Walz that a tax exemption is not a form of direct
aid to religious organizations because an exemption only requires the
government to refrain from imposing a burden on the church.256 Be
cause no public funds are transferred in a loan funded by revenue
bonds, the tax exemption is only an indirect economic benefit.257
Granted, the exemption in a revenue bond issuance differs from
the exemption considered in Walz in two senses. A revenue bond issu
ance requires a different sort of activity from the government. The
government does not "simply abstain" from taxing the recipient insti
tution but instead authorizes and structures a transaction having that
effect.258 The difference between this authorization and the legislative
action behind a tax exemption of the kind considered in Walz , how
ever, is not great considering that both exemptions require explicit
legislative authorization.259 Revenue bond issuances merely require
one additional authorization - that of the authority empowered to is
sue such bonds - before the administration of the transaction is

253. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 6 &
n.7, Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 241 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-1884) [hereinafter
Petitioner's Brief].
254. See id. at 6-7:
The issuance of tax-exempt revenue bonds . . . for the benefit of a religious school is not an
"indirect tax benefit," but instead is a direct subsidy in the form of substantially lower inter
est payments on the loan. And this direct subsidy to the religious school is indeed paid for by
"public funds" in the form of lost revenue to the (stateJ treasury from the non-tax-exempt in
terest it would have received had the construction been financed by a commercial loan.

Cf Walz, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970):
The essence of the appellant's contention was that the New York City Tax Commission's

grant of an exemption to church property indirectly requires the appellant to make a contri
bution to religious bodies and thereby violates provisions prohibiting establishment of re
ligion under the First Amendment which under the Fourteenth Amendment is binding on
States.

255. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
256. Id. at 675.
257. See id. at 674.
258. Cf id. at 675 (describing a tax exemption as the state "simply abstain(ing]" from
imposing a financial burden).
259. See id. at 666-67 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1, which authorizes the tax exemp
tion).
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turned over to other parties such as the trustee and underwriter.260
Second, revenue bond issuances differ from a tax exemption such as
that evaluated in Walz because revenue bond issuances exempt the in
terest gained by bond purchasers rather than any funds received by
the religious institution itself. Any benefit derived by religious institu
tions, however, stems directly from the tax exemption accorded to
bond purchasers. The tax exemption therefore benefits the religious
institution receiving a less expensive loan as much as it does the bond
purchasers who directly benefit from the exemption - and only be
cause of the exemption given to bond purchasers.
Some commentators have concluded that the government's indi
rect aid via the issuance of revenue bonds directly assists the recipient
institution in its religious mission because, in providing financial sup
port to an institution's secular functions, this aid allows the institution
to devote more of its financial resources to indoctrination.261 The
Court has unfailingly rejected this line of reasoning.262 Indeed, if the
argument had any merit, the Court could never have approved aid to
the secular functions of even merely sectarian schools, as any such aid
would have the effect of leaving the school with more resources to
spend on religious indoctrination.
As Hunt makes clear then,263 the nature of government aid in a
revenue bond issuance is limited to the creation of the authority em
powered to issue revenue bonds and the subsequent difference be
tween the cost of a loan funded by revenue bonds and the likely cost
of a private loan. This difference is attributable solely to the tax ex
emption for interest received by bond purchasers and, according to
Walz , a tax exemption is at best an indirect economic benefit.264
Under the final element of the excessive entanglement analysis, it
is necessary to consider the relationship between church and state that
ensues from a revenue bond-funded loan. While a revenue bond issu
ance clearly involves some degree of interaction between a pervasively
sectarian institution and the government through the conduit issuer,
church-state interaction qua church-state interaction does not neces-

260. See infra Part 111.B.
261. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 693 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part)
(arguing that "[m]oney not spent for one purpose becomes available for other purposes").
262. See Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(stating that, while the Court acknowledges that aiding a religious institution's secular func
tions will free resources for "sectarian ends," the Court "never has held that religious activi
ties must be discriminated against" by denying secular aid.); see also Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679
(plurality opinion) ("[B]us transportation, textbooks, and tax exemptions all gave aid in the
sense that religious bodies would otherwise have been forced to find other sources from
which to finance these services. Yet all of these forms of government assistance have been
upheld." (citing, inter alia, Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968))).
263. 413 U.S. 734, 745 n.7 (1973).
264. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
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sarily violate the Establishment Clause. As the Court stated in
Agostini, "Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and we
have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two. "265
Rather, the church-state entanglement must be excessive in order to
violate the Establishment Clause.266 The Court has placed great em
phasis on the frequency and extent of contact between the govern
ment and the religious authority behind a school or institution of
higher education in determining whether administrative entanglement
is excessive. In Lemon, the Court found excessive entanglement where
the possibility for diversion of government aid to religious indoctrina
tion necessitated a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
state surveillance."267 Although the Court has subsequently rejected
the presumption that prompted the need for continuing surveillance in
Lemon,268 this development leaves untouched the principle that suffi
ciently intrusive surveillance is a form of excessive entanglement.
Thus, the Court has approved of aid distributed in the form of a "one
time, single-purpose" grant269 and aid distributed annually with only
" 'quick and non-judgmental' " audits of a sectarian university's use of
government aid.270
The general extent of a state or municipality's entanglement with
the religious authorities behind a pervasively sectarian institution is
extremely limited, as the following description of a typical conduit is
suance shows.271 The initial act in transactions such as those detailed in
Lynn and Steele is the legislative creation of an agency (an "author
ity") authorized to issue revenue bonds.272 The borrowing party (the
"entity") then approaches the authority with a proposed project

265. 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (internal citation omitted).
266. Id.
267. 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971); see also id. at 622 (finding excessive entanglement where
the government's inspection of a religiously oriented school's financial records would foster
"an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state").
268. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
269. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 688.
270. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764 (plurality opinion) (quoting
Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282, 1296 (D. Md. 1974)).
271 . The following passage describes the most conupon elements of a revenue bond is
suance as reflected in case law and certain secondary sources. It is possible that a given issu
ance will vary to some degree.
272. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 736-39 (1973)) (describing the issuance of
revenue bonds by South Carolina's Educational Facilities Authority pursuant to S.C. CODE
ANN. 22-41 .4 (currently codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-101-10 to -109-180 (Law Co-op.
1990) & Supp. 2001))); Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 700-01 (M.D. Tenn.
2000) (discussing the issuance of revenue bonds by a Tennessee industrial development
board pursuant to TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-53-lOl(ll)(A)(vii) (Supp. 1990); Va. Coll. Bldg.
Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 687 (Va. 2000) (discussing the issuance of revenue bonds by
Virginia's Educational Facilities Authority pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 23-30.42 (Michie
2000) ).
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seeking a revenue bond-funded loan to finance it.273 The authority ap
proves the revenue bond issuance, sometimes after a public hearing274
or with independent approval of the issuance from a third party.275 A
trustee is responsible for supervising the entity's adherence to the loan
agreement, receiving payments from the entity, and representing the
interests of bondholders.276 An underwriter purchases unsold bonds
from the authority and subsequently resells them on the bond market
to individual purchasers.277
The authority is not required to monitor the entity's compliance
with the terms of the loan agreement and, moreover, is not obligated
to ensure that the entity does not use secular aid for sectarian pur
poses. Likewise, the authority plays no role in redistributing payments
from the private entity to bondholders. The government's involvement
therefore amounts to little more than the initial creation of the issuing
authority and the subsequent approval of the transaction.278 This in
volvement is far closer to that approved in Tilton than to the continu
ing surveillance rejected in Lemon. 219
In assessing the degree of political entanglement, the essential
question is whether the aid under consideration would lead to "politi
cal division along religious lines. "280 With revenue bond issuances such
as those under consideration here, the Court is unlikely to reach such
a finding. Colleges and universities have traditionally been subject to
greater leniency in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause juris-

273. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 738 (describing the proposal submitted by Baptist College at
Charleston to South Carolina's Educational Facilities Authority); Steele, 1 17 F. Supp. 2d at
694 (noting that Lipscomb University asked the industrial development board for a "$15
million, low-interest loan"); Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 688 (describing Regent University's applica
tion to the Educational Facilities Authority).
274. See, e.g. , Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (noting that the industrial development
board held two public hearings prior to approving Lipscomb University's proposal).
275. See, e.g., id. at 702-03 (describing the mayor's role in certifying that the proposed
bond issuance would be exempt from federal taxation).
276. ROBERT LAMB, ET AL. THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS AND PUBLIC
FINANCE 868 (1993) (defining "trustee").
277. See id. at 24.
278. The issuance in Hunt varied slightly from the transaction discussed in this Section.
In Hunt, "the College would convey the project to . . . the Authority, which would lease the
property so conveyed to the College. After payment in full of the bonds, the project would
be reconveyed to the College." Hunt, 413 U.S. at 738. Neither the Lynn nor Steele transac
tions included this kind of conveyance.
279. See MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW, supra note 16, § 3.4.3 (applying the "exces
sive entanglement" inquiry and concluding - even without considering the role of a trustee
in supervising the beneficiary university in lieu of the conduit issuer - that the government's
role "seems to entangle church and state no more than the planning that precedes direct
grants of government funds to sectarian institutions, where the Supreme Court has approved
the relationship"(citing Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976))).
280. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
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prudence than primary or secondary schools.281 In addition, the Court
noted in Roemer the fact that "more than two-thirds" of private col
leges have no religious affiliation, apparently reasoning that when the
government extends aid to all private colleges, such aid will not give
the impression that the government is promoting religious education
in particular. 282
In the case of revenue bond issuances, moreover, a rule excluding
consideration of an applicant's religious orientation is less likely to
lead to "political division along religious lines"283 than a rule author
izing the government to inquire into an applicant's religious affiliation.
If a conduit issuer must bar institutions such as Lipscomb and Regent
from participating in revenue bond financing, that authority would
have to inquire into each applicant's religious affiliation, gauging the
degree to which religion permeates a university's curriculum and as
sessing the likelihood that secular aid would be diverted to religious
purposes.284 Moreover, the Authority may have to conduct this inquiry
in the context of a public hearing, a possibility that could produce the
"political division along religious lines" that the Court envisioned with
trepidation in Lemon.285 Even if state authorities were able to conduct
such inquiry without bias, it is inevitable that rejection of an institu
tion's proposal based on its religious affiliation would lead to litiga
tion, as this determination would rest on a subjective characterization
of the extent to which religion pervades an applicant's curriculum. In
contrast, if state authorities issued revenue bonds without regard to a
beneficiary's religious orientation, political division would be less
likely because any applicant could make a proposal to an issuing
authority without having to justify its religious - or secular - orien
tation. Once the Court recognizes the participation of pervasively sec
tarian institutions in such financing arrangements as in accord with the
First Amendment, any litigation arising from an authority's approval
of a revenue bond issuance is unlikely to center on the applicant's re
ligious persuasion.

281. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971) (plurality opinion) (rea
soning that the "potential for divisive religious fragmentation" at a college or university is
mitigated by the fact that a college or university is likely to have a diverse student body); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 12.2.6.3 (describing the Court's "more lenient" stance
toward aid that benefits colleges and universities).
282. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 765-66 (plurality opinion).
283. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
284. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 701 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (stating
that, before approving a bond issuance, the industrial development board must determine
that the bonds will advance a "legitimate public purpose" - a finding that would be impos
sible if the issuance violated the Establishment Clause).
285. 403 U.S. at 622.
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The Conduit Issuer's Approval Under the Endorsement Analysis
This Section shows that, besides satisfying the Lemon/Agostini ef

fect analysis, revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian
institutions also comply with the endorsement test.286 Although the
Court has long considered whether a government action endorses re
ligion, Justice O'Connor articulated a "sound analytical framework"287
for an endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly,288 which the Court
adopted in 1989 in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union. 289 The underlying logic of the endorsement test is that the Es
tablishment Clause prohibits the government from "appearing to take
a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence
to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community. ' "290 When applying this test, the Court considers whether
a particular government act has endorsed, favored, or promoted re
ligion in general or a specific religious orientation.291 The Court views
the government act under inquiry from the perspective of a "reason
able observer,"292 asking whether the government has "discriminate[d]
in favor of private religious . . . activity. "293
While the Court has typically applied the endorsement test in the
context of the placement of a physical display such as a creche on gov
ernment property,294 it is possible to apply the test to a less tangible act
such as the authorization df a revenue bond issuance.295 This analysis
presents certain challenges in this more abstract context. As articu
lated in Lynch and Allegheny, the endorsement analysis requires that
a court consider the symbol constituting the would-be endorsement in

286. See, e.g., Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (de
scribing the "endorsement" test).
287. Id. at 595 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
288. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, did not violate the Establishment Clause by including a creche in its Christmas display).
289. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
290. Id. at 594 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
291. Id. at 592-94; see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 763 (1995) (plurality opinion) ("Our cases have accordingly equated 'endorsement' with
'promotion' or 'favoritism.' ").
·

292. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (in
ternal quotation marks omitted).
293. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 764 (plurality opinion).
294. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (creche and menorah); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668
(creche).
295. Indeed, the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee noted in Steele that
the Sixth Circuit has substituted the endorsement analysis for the "effects" prong of the
Lemon test. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 731 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
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context - its "physical setting" and "unique circumstances."296 In
Steele, the District Court for the Middle District Of Tennessee applied
this test by focusing on the Official Statement released pursuant to the
issuance of revenue bonds.297 The court noted that the Official State
ment "places the government's role first and then describes the uni
versity, the project, and the uses of the funds provided through the
bond proceeds,'' adding that the description of the university goes into
the school's religious orientation in depth.298 Based on this review of
the Official Statement, the court concluded that " [t]he structure and
content of the Official Statement indicates to the reasonable observer
that the Board . . . is endorsing the sectarian beliefs and teachings of
Lipscomb University. "299
Because the standard in Lynch and Allegheny requires that the
court place the offending act or object in its context and that the court
view the would-be endorsement in its actual setting,300 Steele's en
dorsement inquiry is inadequate for two reasons. First, an Official
Statement's context is a proposed municipal bond issuance. Thus, this
document has a particular reasonable observer as its intended audi
ence: a prospective bond purchaser engaged in making an investment
decision. Just as a reasonable observer in an art museum appreciates a
religious work of art as art,301 a reasonable observer of an Official
Statement must view this document as a solicitation for a financial
transaction rather than a statement of the government's position con
cerning religion. Second, the endorsement analysis should take into
account that the Official Statement is one of a multitude of such
documents released by the development authority. This conclusion
follows from Justice O'Connor's art museum illustration in Lynch.302
Because a museum includes a variety of paintings of secular and re-

296. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lynch (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
297. 117 F. Supp. 2d at 733-34.
298. Id. at 733 (noting that the Official Statement provides: "As stated in its 1990-91
school catalog, the supreme purpose of the University is 'to teach the Bible as the revealed
will of God to man and as the only and sufficient rule of faith and practice, and to train those
who attend in a pure Bible Christianity' ").
299. Id. at 734. The court suggests, however, that it might have reached a different out
come had the Official Statement included a disclaimer. Id.
300. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (Blackmun, J.); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
·

301. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although the religious and
indeed sectarian significance of the creche, as the District Court found, is not neutralized by
the setting, the overall holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the
purpose of the display - as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious
content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of that content. The
display celebrates a public holiday, and no one contends that declaration of that holiday is
understood to be an endorsement of religion.").
302. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ligious content, a single religious painting does not convey a message
of endorsement.303 A court applying the reasonable observer test to an
official statement, therefore, must consider that document in its ,par
ticular setting.304 A reasonable observer would have no reason to view
any single official statement as a government endorsement of the re
cipient university's religious orientation because the observer would
be aware of issuances benefiting other universities with alternative re
ligious and secular orientations.
An official statement is part of a complex financial transaction and,
as such, a court applying the reasonable observer analysis must look
beyond the pages of the official statement to the statutory authoriza
tion for the transaction and the ensuing relationships between issuer,
beneficiary, and trustee.305 In this context, a reasonable observer may
view the bond issuance benefiting a pervasively sectarian university in
the context of the legislature's desire to promote higher education,306
the neutral availability of revenue bond financing,307 and the govern
ment's de minimis involvement in any given transaction.308 That this
government aid is available and, in fact, utilized by institutions repre
senting a wide variety of religious viewpoints should suggest to a rea
sonable observer that the government does not endorse or favor the
religion of any single participant. From this perspective, religion is
wholly irrelevant.
In the final analysis, the endorsement analysis is satisfied only if an
authority empowered to issue revenue bonds does not take an appli
cant's religious orientation into account in determining whether to
authorize a bond issuance. In concluding, as the district court did in
Steele, that the authority must exclude certain applicants because of
their religious beliefs and the extent to which these beliefs inform their
actions in ostensibly secular affairs, the court would require the gov
ernment to disfavor certain religious persuasions. This result makes an

303. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
304. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (Blackmun, J.).
305. Whether or not a government action is an endorsement "depends upon the mes
sage that the government's practice communicates: the question is 'what viewers may fairly
understand to be the purpose of the display.' " Id. (Blackmun, J.) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The purpose of an official statement for a proposed
revenue bond issuance depends upon the statutory authorization for the issuance and the
nature of the ensuing transaction.
306. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 700 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (quoting
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-53-lOl(ll)(A)(vii) (2000 Supp.)) (stating that the board issuing reve
nue bonds to Lipscomb University as powered "to approve tax-exempt bonds for various
public works and projects, including 'any nonprofit educational institution in any manner
related to or in furtherance of the educational purposes of such institution' " (alteration in
original)).
307. See, e.g. , id.
308. See supra Section III. A.
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applicant's religious affiliation relevant to its "standing in the political
community," a practice the Supreme Court has recognized as plainly
contrary to the basic mandate of the Establishment Clause.309
CONCLUSION

Constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky has protested what he
identifies as the Supreme Court's recent tendency to place near exclu
sive emphasis on neutrality in the distribution of government aid, ar
guing that such a standard violates the "values of the Establishment
Clause":
First, freedom of conscience would be offended because people would be
forced to support and subsidize religions that they do not believe in, even
if all religions are treated equally. Second, treating all religions equally
does not address the need to make all feel comfortable with their gov
ernment. Those who disavow any religious belief would be forced to
support all religions; indeed, they would be surrounded with parochial
schools supported by their tax dollars. . . . Third, [neutrality does not]
protect religions from the intrusion of government involvement. Justice
Thomas' equality theory would mean that the government would be en
meshed in almost every aspect of religious schools and religious institu
tions. The government, as a condition for funding, could ____:_ and should
- set curricula and educational requirements. The government would
need to monitor to see if these mandates were met. This is a threat to re
ligion and it is no Jess so because all religions are threatened equally.310

This Note has shown that not a single one of the legitimate dangers
identified here by Professor Chemerinsky - neither compulsory sub
sidization, nor endorsement, nor the intrusion of government into sec
tarian activities - is present when pervasively sectarian institutions
participate in conduit financing. The unique qualities of a revenue
bond issuance - its neutral allocation of government aid, minimal
contact between church and state, and absolute exclusion of public
funds from aid to religious universities - obviate any genuine Estab
lishment Clause concerns. Conduit financing, therefore, presents a
special case of government aid to religious institutions that remains
faithful to the "wall of separation"3 1 1 between church and state.

309. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-94 (Blackmun, J.) ("Whether the key word is 'en
dorsement,' 'favoritism,' or 'promotion,' the essential principle remains the same. The Es
tablishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a posi
tion on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community.' " (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
310. Chemerinsky, supra note 154, at 232.
311. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 n.1 (attributing the "wall of separation" metaphor to
Thomas Jefferson).

